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A PUBLIC INTEREST MODEL FOR APPLYING LOST
CHANCE THEORY TO PROBABILISTIC INJURIES IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
PAUL M. SECUNDA•

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, a growing number of federal courts 1 have begun
to utilize the "loss of a chance" remedial approach2 to determine the
value of probabilistic injuries3 in competitive hiring and promotion cases
in the employment discrimination context. 4 Under this approach, courts

*
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also like to commend the research assistance of Jeff Farrar, Mississippi Law School
Class of 2003, and David Splaingard and Robin Samson, both of the University of
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Young-Secunda, without whom I would accomplish little.
1.
See Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[The loss of a
chance] basis for an award of damages is not accepted in all jurisdictions, but it is
gaining ground .... "). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has taken
the lead in applying lost chance theory to employment discrimination cases. See, e.g.,
Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 2004); Bishop v. Gainer, 272
F.3d 1009, 1015-17 (7th Cir. 2001); Doll, 75 F.3d at 1205-07.
2.
The "loss of a chance" remedial approach, or "lost chance theory," is only
one type of recognized proportional liability scheme. MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE FUTURE
OF PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY 6 n.13 (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper
No. 04-14, 2004) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=610563 (to be published in
EXPLORING TORT LAw (Stuart Maddened.) (forthcoming Aug. 2005)); Lars Noah, An
Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24 REv.
LITIG.
(forthcoming
2005)
(manuscript
at
2),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=646084 ("'[L]oss of a chance' represents just one facet of
broader debates about probabilistic evidence and proportional recovery in tort law.").
See generally John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion
Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1063 (1989). Although there are
other proportionality schemes, such as "market-share" and "increased risk
enhancement," see GREEN, supra, at 6, this Article discusses only lost chance theory
and its appropriateness in the employment discrimination context.
3.
A "probabilistic injury," as used in this Article, refers to an injury that not
only cannot be established with absolute certainty (like most injuries), but also is one for
which statistical evidence permits an enhanced evaluation of the relevant probabilities.
See GREEN, supra note 2, at 5, 7, 64. Probabilistic injuries in the employment
discrimination context generally oecur in the competitive hiring or promotion settings.
See Doll, 75 F.3d at 1206. In these types of cases, it is possible to marshal statistical
likelihoods to determine the probabilities of a plaintiff having received the competitive
position in the first instance. See infra Part IV .B.2.
4.
Because of the uncertainties assoeiated with competitive hiring and
promotion cases, lost chance theory has been considered particularly apt in this context.
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discount the value of a job by the probability that the discriminatedagainst plaintiff would have received a competitive position in the
absence of discrimination. 5 For example, if a court fmds that a plaintiff
had only a 25% chance of receiving a promotion in the absence of
discrimination, the plaintiff is awarded 25% of the value of that job. 6
Chief Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, a chief proponent of implementing the lost chance
theory in this employment discrimination context, has argued
persuasively that such a remedial scheme leads to "more just and
equitable results" 7 than solely relying upon a "causation inquiry [which]
has traditionally had an aU-or-nothing effect on the outcome of a tort
claim." 8
Nevertheless, the application of lost chance theory to these types of
employment discrimination cases is not free from controversy. 9 Critics
Doll, 75 F.3d at 1206. As the Seventh Circuit wrote in Doll: "It strikes us as peculiarly
appropriate in employment cases involving competitive promotion [to apply the lost
chance theory]. In such a case the plaintiffs chances are inherently uncertain because of
the competitive setting." !d. Whether lost chance theory may apply outside of this
subset of employment discrimination cases is beyond the scope of this Article.
5.
See id.; Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in
Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90
YALE L.J. 1353, 1354, 1356 (1980); see also AmyL. Wax, Discrimination as Accident,
74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1220 (1999).
Under a probabilistic scheme, each plaintiff is awarded an amount
proportional to the calculated expected contribution of the actionable
cause ... to the decision in his case. "The proportionality rule discounts
recovery by the probability that the plaintiffs loss was caused by some other
wrongdoer, by a nonculpable source, or by the plaintiff."
Wax, supra, at 1220 (quoting David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849, 881
(1984)).
See Doll, 75 F. 3d at 1206 (setting forth a hypothetical example of how lost
6.
chance theory applies in the employment discrimination context). As will be discussed
in greater detail below, the 25% loss of chance derives from the fact that the individual
had a 25% chance of obtaining the position prior to the discrimination and a 0% chance
once discriminatorily denied. See infra Part IV.B.2.
See Doll, 75 F.3d at 1207.
7.
8.
King, supra note 5, at 1356.
9.
See Wax, supra note 5, at 1224-25 (presenting a critique of probabilistic
recoveries in employment discrimination cases). Indeed, application of lost chance
theory beyond the medical malpractice context continues to be somewhat unsettled. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) §
26 cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002); see also David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for
Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 605, 610 (2001) (observing that use of loss
of a chance is controversial in tort law generally because it is seen as undermining the
traditional requirement that damages be proven by a preponderance of the evidence);
Jonathan P. Kieffer, The Case for Across-the-Board Application of the Loss-of-Chance
Doctrine, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 568, 568 (1997) ("[T]he loss-of-chance doctrine results in
significant inequities for defendants."); Tory A. Weigand, Loss of Chance in Medical
Malpractice: A Look at Recent Developments, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 301, 311 (2003)
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claim that it is sheer speculation to quantify the probability of a given
individual receiving a competitive position in the absence of
discrimination. 10 Unlike the medical malpractice context in which lost
chance theory is more commonly utilized, 11 and where estimations
concerning the chance of surviving a deadly disease are based upon past
medical experiences of doctors treating patients with similar
conditions, 12 the employment context provides no such convenient data
to consult. 13
Even so, the absence of convenient evidence should not diminish
the basic soundness of the lost chance approach to probabilistic injuries
in competitive hiring and promotion cases. 14 Echoing Judge Posner to a
substantial degree, this Article contends that, although uncertainty will
inevitably challenge fact finders to fix percentages for these employment
discrimination plaintiffs, 15 such uncertainty is not insuperable, and is, in

(maintaining that the loss of chance doctrine fundamentally alters causation and lowers
the burden of proof in medical malpractice cases). Even so, lost chance theory has made
significant inroads in the medical malpractice context in the last twenty-five years or so.
See GREEN, supra note 2, at 3-4 ("For the most part, courts have followed Professor
King's suggestion that the harm be reconceptualized as a lost opportunity for cure rather
than by adopting proportional liability for the adverse outcome.").
See Wax, supra note 5, at 1134 (arguing that in the unconscious bias
10.
context, "[a] probabilistic system will justify itself neither in producing well-calibrated
risk reduction nor in directing compensation to the right persons").
11.
Fischer, supra note 9, at 605 ("Tort lawyers in the United States often
think of 'loss of a chance' as a theory of 'probabilistic causation' that only applies to
medical malpractice misdiagnosis cases.").
12.
See id. at 649 (arguing that chance calculations can be based on scientific
studies that depend on the etiology of a disease or the characteristics of an injury); King,
supra note 5, at 1386 ("One may deduce the probability figure [in medical malpractice
cases] from so-called 'relative frequency' by looking at the way in which the same or
similar forces operated in the past."). But see GREEN, supra note 2, at 66 ("I wonder
about the quality of evidence employed even in medical malpractice lost opportunity
cases.").
13.
See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206 ("The difference between employment
discrimination and medical and other forms of personal-injury tort is that the relevant
probabilities may be more difficult to compute in the employment setting."). The
bewildering array of permutations in calculating the probability of an applicant or
employee receiving a job exists as a result of competing candidates' overlapping skill
sets, numerous personality types (among both candidates and those who hire them), as
well as other subjective intangibles, which play differing roles in deciding whether an
individual will receive a job or promotion in a competitive circumstance. See Griffin v.
Mich. Dep't of Corr., 5 F.3d 186, 189 (6th Cir. 1993); Bryson B. Moore, South
Carolina Rejects the Lost Chance Doctrine, 48 S.C. L. REv. 201, 214 (1996) ("A major
problem with extending the doctrine to other fields is the greater difficulty in
ascertaining the percentage chance lost.").
14.
For a discussion on how probabilities can nevertheless still be determined
in employment discrimination cases, see infra notes 229-38 and accompanying text.
15.
Indeed, all cases involve some degree of uncertainty. GREEN, supra note
2, at 5 ("Evidence is never perfect; uncertainty always exists.").
HeinOnline -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 749 2005
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fact, a traditional feature of employment discrimination remedies. 16
That being said, this Article does part company with Judge Posner over
whether a "pure" or "symmetrical" version of lost chance theory 17
should be applied to so-called "better-than-even" chance cases. 18
In its place, this Article advocates for, based upon statutory 19 and
prudentiaf0 reasons, a public interest model for applying lost chance
theory in the employment discrimination context. 21 Under this hybrid
16.
See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977).
"After the victims [of discrimination] have been identified, the court must, as nearly as
possible, 'recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there been
no' unlawful discrimination." /d. (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 769 (1976)). This process of recreating the past will necessarily involve a degree
of approximation and imprecision. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1207 ("Yet no less uncertainty
attends the efforts of triers of fact to fix the percentage of a plaintiffs negligence in a
tort case governed, as most tort cases are today, by the rule of comparative
negligence.") (citations omitted). For a discussion on whether an appropriate analogy
exists between comparative negligence and lost chance theory, see infra note 77.
By "pure" or "symmetrical," this Article means a version of lost chance
17.
theory that advances an across-the-board application of lost chance theory in both highprobability and low-probability employment discrimination cases. Doll, 15 F.3d at
1205-06. Bur see Michelle L. Truckor, Comment, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: Legal
Recovery for Patients on the Edge of Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L. REv. 349, 351 (1999)
(arguing for an asymmetrical pure lost chance theory in the tort context). Thus, an
applicant with a 75% chance of being hired would receive 75% of the value of the job if
successful in making out a claim of employment discrimination, not the entire amount as
under the traditional ali-or-nothing approach. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206; see also infra
note 22.
18.
In "better-than-even" chance cases, a term coined by Professor Joseph
King, a plaintiff has shown that she had a better-than-even chance of securing a
favorable result in the absence of the defendant's wrongdoing. King, supra note 5, at
1387. Traditionally, most courts in better-than-even chance cases value the better-thaneven chance as though it had materialized or was certain to do so and award the full
value of the job. See id. In contrast, both King and Chief Judge Richard Posner of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit advocate pure lost chance theory under
which damages are discounted in all cases in order to promote a more accurate loss
allocation. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206; King, supra note 5, at 1387; see also Truckor,
supra note 17, at 359.
19.
See infra Part III.A.
20.
See infra Part III.B.
21.
Indeed, the impetus behind this public interest approach derives in part
from a recent empirical observation made by Professor Michael Selmi. Michael Selmi,
The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination
In analyzing
Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1249, 1252 (2003).
employment discrimination class action lawsuits, Sclmi found that "[t]here is no longer
any concerted effort to eliminate discrimination; instead, efforts are directed at providing
monetary compensation for past discrimination without particular concern for preventing
future discrimination, or even remedying past discrimination, through injunctive relief."
/d. The public interest model to lost chance theory in employment discrimination
described in this Article is one attempt to revitalize the important public-regarding
aspects of employment discrimination law; albeit through the use of a type of equitable
monetary relief rather than through injunctive structural change as Selmi advocates. See
HeinOnline -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 750 2005
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approach, lost chance theory will be applied in low probability cases
where the plaintiff cannot prove a better-than-even chance of having
received the position in the absence of discrimination, whereas the
traditional "aU-or-nothing approach " 22 will apply in high probability,
better-than-even chance cases. 23 This approach is based on the explicit
recognition that employment discrimination law, unlike traditional tort
law, seeks not only to make victims of discrimination whole, 24 but also
to vindicate the statutory mandate of eradicating all unlawful
discrimination from the economy. 25 As a consequence, the public
id. at 1300; see also infra Part liLA.
22.
As used throughout this Article, the traditional "aU-or-nothing approach"
refers to a system in which "[c]ompensation is awarded if the plaintiff proves causation
and other elements of liability by a designated standard of proof, which in civil actions is
a preponderance of the evidence." Wax, supra note 5, at 1212; see also Truckor, supra
note 17, at 354.
See Lori R. Ellis, Note, Loss of Chance as Technique: Toeing the Line at
23.
Fifty Percent, 72 TEX. L. REv. 369, 372 (1993) (advocating a similar hybrid approach to
lost chance theory in the medical malpractice context).
24.
See Zaven T. Saroyan, The Current Injustice of the Loss of Chance
Doctrine: An Argument for a New Approach to Damages, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 15
(2002) ("Though the law of torts has many goals, its primary function is to determine
when compensation for a harm caused should be required.").
25.
Although one of the primary purposes of tort law is also deterrence, see
Wax, supra note 5, at 1132-33, tort law seeks to find the appropriate balance of activity
and risk. See GREEN, supra note 2, at 62 (describing the law and economics literature in
tort law based on the idea "that if actors bear just the right amount of liability for the
harm they cause, we will reach an optimal balance between accident costs and
prevention costs"). Judge Learned Hand's famous formula of B < PL for determining
whether to engage in risky behavior is based on this balance. See United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (stating that an actor's duty "to
provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables ... if the probability be
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than
L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL"). /d. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII"), on the other hand, engages in no such balance, and bans outright all
unlawful forms of employment discrimination based on a legislative determination that
there is no social value to any of the proscribed forms of employment discrimination.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer-(!) to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin .... "). Not just deterrence, but eradication of unlawful employment
discrimination from the workplace is the ultimate goal of laws like Title VII. See Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,771 (1976) ("[T]he denial of seniority relief to
victims of illegal racial discrimination in hiring is permissible 'only for reasons which, if
applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered
through past discrimination.'") (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
421 (1975)) (emphasis added); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 292 (2002) (recognizing that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has the statutory authority to vindicate both the
private and public interests served by Title VII).
HeinOnline -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 751 2005
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interest model permits punitive-like equitable relief2 6 against employers
as an additional way to effectuate the statutory mandate animating
employment discrimination law. 27
The public interest model will have beneficial effects in at least two
important respects. First, it will promote additional deterrence even
where the employee is unable to prove a better-than-even chance of
receiving a position in the absence of discrimination, thereby eliminating
the possibility of a discriminating employer being found completely
blameless in circumstances in which unlawful conduct is clearly
involved. 28 Second, and simultaneously, this modified approach will
provide additional incentives for employers to take preventive actions to
avoid liability, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent in recent
employment discrimination cases. 29
Critics of this model will no doubt argue that this approach is
inconsistent with the loss allocation goals of tort law, 30 and that such an
approach will needlessly overcompensate plaintiffs in a punitive
manner. 31 In response, this Article makes a two-prong defense. First,
these critics place too much emphasis on the private, "make whole"
relief function of employment discrimination law, while paying
insufficient heed to plausibly the more important public policy goals of
these laws. 32 Secondly, and connected with the first point, the
26.
This Article will contend that "punitive-type" equitable relief is different in
kind and nature than traditional punitive damages (which are awarded in employment
discrimination law cases under the now familiar Kolstad framework). See infra notes
184-86 and accompanying text.
27.
See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294-95 ("[W]hile punitive damages benefit
the individual employee, they also serve an obvious public function in deterring future
violations.") (citing Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,266-70 (1981)).
See Doll, 75 F. 3d at 1206 (promoting the lost chance theory in employment
28.
discrimination cases as a way to prevent undercompensation and underdeterrence).
29.
In both Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. E/lerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the U.S. Supreme Court
adopted a modified vicarious liability approach in order to give employers incentives to
take preventive and corrective actions regarding sexual harassment in the workplace.
See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2345 (2004) ("[In Faragher and
E/lerth,] the Court ... recognized that a liability limitation linked to an employer's
effort to install effective grievance procedures and an employee's effort to report
harassing behavior would advance Title VII's conciliation and deterrence purposes.")
(citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The proposed
remedial approach in this Article satisfies these same prophylactic interests. See infra
notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
30.
See King, supra note 5, at 1387.
31.
See Wax, supra note 5, at 1134.
See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418; see also Franks, 424 U.S. at 779
32.
n.40 (1976) ("'[C]laims under Title VII involve the vindication of a major public
interest ... . '") (quoting a section-by-section analysis accompanying the EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 CONFERENCE REPORT, 118 CONG. REC. 7166,
7168 (1972)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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concededly pumttve aspects of overcompensating plaintiffs in betterthan-even chance cases should be embraced, rather than rejected, as
being consistent with the broader statutory mandate of these laws: to
protect the public from the insidious consequences of discriminatory
employer conduct. 33 In all, the public interest model is most consistent
with the "central statutory purposes" 34 served by federal
antidiscrimination legislation. 35
This Article presents the public interest model for applying lost
chance theory to probabilistic injuries in employment discrimination
cases in four parts. Part I explores the underlying mechanics of pure
lost chance theory as developed by Professor Joseph King, as well as its
first important practical tort application in the seminal case Herskovits v.
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound. 36 Part II then evaluates
Judge Posner's suggestion that pure lost chance theory should apply to
probabilistic injuries in employment discrimination cases, as well as the
theory's subsequent adoption by the Seventh Circuit in the employment
discrimination cases of Bishop v. Gainerl1 and Biondo v. City of
Chicago. 38 Part III asserts that pure lost chance theory conflicts with
both statutory and prudential concerns underlying federal employment
discrimination laws. To remedy these deficiencies, Part IV advances a
public interest model for applying lost chance theory to probabilistic
injuries in competitive hiring and promotion cases, thus providing a
more consistent approach with regard to the public policy underlying the
employment discrimination laws.

33.
See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 295. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in
Waffle House:
we are persuaded that, pursuant to Title VII and the [Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990], whenever the EEOC chooses from among the
many charges filed each year to bring an enforcement action in a particular
case, the agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply
provide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely
victim-specific relief.
/d.

34.
See supra note 25.
35.
By federal antidiscrimination legislation, this Article has in mind statutes
like the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); the Age id. U.S.C. § 791; 42 U.S.C. §
1981 ("Section 1981 "); Title VII, id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), id. §§ 12101-12117.
36.
664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (en bane).
37.
272 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 2001).
38.
382 F. 3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004).
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A.

THE RUDIMENTS OF LOST CHANCE THEORY

The Theoretical Underpinnings: Separating Causationfrom
Valuation

In his seminal piece on lost chance theory, King complained that
courts in tort cases were guilty of applying the concept of causation
improperly to matters of valuation. 39 Whereas causation concerns "the
cause and effect relationship that must be established between tortious
conduct and a loss before liability for that loss may be imposed, " 40
valuation involves "the process of identifying and measuring the loss
that was caused by the tortious conduct. "41 Put more succinctly,
whereas causation concerns whether a plaintiff should recover for a loss,
valuation concerns how much the plaintiff should recover for a loss. 42
Nevertheless, many courts today still follow an ali-or-nothing
approach 43 under which the interest in a favorable outcome is either
redressed completely or completely ignored. 44 In other words, these
courts treat "the chance of avoiding a loss as if it were either a certainty
or impossibility," and thus, "the plaintiff will recover for a lost
opportunity only if it appears more likely than not that but for the tort
some definitive adverse result would have been avoided. "45
Contrariwise, if the probability of the lost chance does not rise above
50%, the plaintiff cannot meet her burden and recovers nothing under
the traditional ali-or-nothing rule. 46 Thus, even if a plaintiff can show
definitively that a defendant has engaged in tortious conduct, which has
caused a loss of a chance of avoiding harm or of receiving a future
benefit, under the ali-or-nothing approach the plaintiff recovers no
compensation. 47 To King and other commentators, this outcome appears
overly harsh and unnecessary. 48
39.
See King, supra note 5, at 1353 (recognizing a tendency to commingle the
concepts of causation and valuation); id. at 1363 ("What caused a loss ... should be a
separate question from what the nature and extent of the loss are.").
40.
/d. at 1363. In other words, "[c]ausation questions relate to the fact of a
loss or of its source." /d. at 1353-54.
41.
/d. at 1354.
42.
See id. at 1389.
43.
Fisher, supra note 8, at 605-06.
See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 26 cmt. n (citing
44.
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 178, at 435 & n.1 (2000)).
45.
King, supra note 5, at 1365.
See Fischer, supra note 9, at 605-06.
46.
47.
See King, supra note 5, at 1356 ("Unless a causal connection is established
under the applicable standard of proof ... the plaintiff will receive nothing for the loss
in question.").
See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 477 (arguing that the traditional ali-or-nothing
48.
approach in medical malpractice context results in "a blanket release from liability for
HeinOnline -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 754 2005
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Seeking to rectify this unsatisfactory legal state of affairs, King
advanced the notion that courts should treat the chance at a favorable
outcome as a compensable interest in its own right. 49 Specifically he
suggested that, "the loss of a chance of achieving a favorable outcome
or of avoiding an adverse consequence should be compensable and
should be valued appropriately, rather than treated as an ali-or-nothing
proposition. "50 Thus, even in cases where the opportunity at a favorable
outcome was not better than even, the interest lost thereby should still be
appropriately valued. 51 Furthermore, he argued for an across-the-board
application, referred to herein as "pure loss of chance theory. "52 Under
pure loss of chance theory, even in cases where the opportunity at a
favorable outcome is better than even, the loss of interest is not treated
as a certainty, but valued based on the probability that the plaintiff
would have received a benefit or avoided harm. 53
doctors and hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of survival,
regardless how flagrant the negligence"); King, supra note 5, at 1373. As King wrote:
"The plaintiff who is able to demonstrate a probability of 50% or less that some future
loss attributable to the tort will occur will be denied redress for that prospective loss.
Yet it is manifest that the plaintiffs interests have been adversely affected." King,
supra note 5, at 1373; see also Fischer, supra note 9, at 618 ("There is no theoretical
basis for requiring that defendant completely destroy the chance in order to be subject to
liability.").
See King, supra note 5, at 1373; see also Todd S. Aagaard, Note,
49.
Identifying and Valuing the Injury in Lost Chance Cases, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1335, 133839 (1998) (criticizing courts and commentators for failing to properly identify the precise
tort injury in lost chance cases). In this manner, King sought to value the true interest
lost when future expectancies were at stake. See King, supra note 5, at 1373; see also
Fischer, supra note 9, at 605 ("[l]f a physician negligently fails to diagnose a curable
disease, and the patient is harmed by the disease, the physician should be liable for
causing the 'loss of a chance' of a cure.").
50.
King, supra note 5, at 1354; see also Fischer, supra note 9, at 617 ("A
major rationale for loss of a chance where plaintiff cannot prove traditional damage is
that the chance of obtaining a benefit or avoiding a harm has value in itself that is
entitled to legal protection.").
51.
King, supra note 5, at 1354. Identifying the interest harmed as the "loss of
a chance" in these cases may lead to another difficult issue: "whether persons deprived
of an opportunity of avoiding harm who nevertheless do not suffer the harm may recover
for the lost opportunity." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 26 cmt. n.
As discussed below, however, commentators have made a distinction between lost
chance theory where the harm has already occurred as opposed to increased risk theory,
where the future harm is still speculative. See infra note 92. In any event, although this
distinction is clearly important in the medical malpractice context, it is less likely to be
so in the employment discrimination context in which lost chance will apply only if
employer liability has been established for engaging in unlawful discrimination in the
first instance. See infra Part II. A.
See Truckor, supra note 17, at 358 (defining "pure loss of a chance
52.
theory").
53.
King, supra note 5, at 1376. According to King: "Loss of a chance should
be compensable even if the chance is not better than even, and it should be recognized
and valued as such rather than an ali-or-nothing proposition. Any other rule fails to
HeinOnline -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 755 2005
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B.

The Cancer Misdiagnosis Hypothetical

In order to more clearly explain how King's lost chance theory
operates in practice, it is helpful to compare the manner in which many
jurisdictions to this day still resolve these tort issues under the ali-ornothing approach, as compared to how the lost chance theory would
The most common scenario
apply in similar circumstances.
contemplated for these purposes, and in fact derived from a scenario set
out by King himself, occurs in the medical malpractice context. 54
Under this scenario, a patient goes to the doctor on date X and
receives a clean bill of health. Three months later on date Y, that same
patient goes to the same doctor, is diagnosed with cancer, and is told
that she has now only a 10% chance of surviving the cancer. If the
patient had been properly diagnosed on date X, she would have had a
40% chance of surviving the cancer.
Unfortunately, the patient
eventually dies from the cancer and her estate brings an action in state
court. 55

satisfy the goals of tort law." /d. For example, where the plaintiff could prove that,
absent discrimination, he would have had a 95% chance of receiving the position in
question, under pure loss of a chance theory he should receive 95% of the value of the
job, not 100% as would be awarded under the traditional ali-or-nothing rule. See
Truckor, supra note 17, at 367-68.
54.
King, supra note 5, at 1363-64. Although medical malpractice is the
context in which most commentators have analyzed lost chance theory, others have
recognized that this remedial approach can apply in various areas of tort law, including
failures to rescue, to warn, to provide safety devices, and to give informed consent to
medical procedures. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 606. But see Noah, supra note 2
(manuscript at 10) ("Those jurisdictions that recognize claims for the loss of less-thaneven odds generally have not extended the theory beyond the medical malpractice
context.").
55.
Assuming, as we do in the hypothetical above, that the patient dies as a
result of the negligent misdiagnosis, a survivorship action rather than a wrongful death
action should be brought under a lost chance theory because in a wrongful death action,
beneficiaries sue in their own right, not as a representative of the deceased person's
estate. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 372-73. Because the beneficiaries of the
deceased have not themselves lost a chance of recovery as a result of the negligence,
they would not appear to have a wrongful death action. See id. at 372; see also Edwards
v. Family Practice Assoc., 798 A.2d 1059, 1063 (Del. 2002) (finding a survivorship
claim to be a more appropriate cause of action than a wrongful death action in a loss of
chance case). On the other hand, a wrongful death action would properly be brought
under an ali-or-nothing approach under which a plaintiff is seeking recovery for the
ultimate harm (that is, the death of the patient). See, e.g., Cooper v. Sisters of Charity
of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971).
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Table A
Hypothetical Loss of a Chance Medical Malpractice Scenario
Visit to Doctor

Diagnosis

Date X
Date Y
(3 months later)

Clean Bill of Health
Cancer Diagnosis

Chance of
Surviving Cancer
40% chance
10% chance

Under the traditional aU-or-nothing approach, the question posed
would be whether the plaintiff could prove by the preponderance of the
evidence that the doctor's negligence in misdiagnosing the patient's
cancer more likely than not caused the patient's death. 56 In this analysis,
the plaintiff seeks redress for the patient's premature death in terms of
the value of that patient's life to others had she lived. 57 However,
because the patient never had more than a 40% chance of surviving the
cancer (even under the best case scenario of being properly diagnosed
on date X), the plaintiff will not be able to meet her evidentiary burden
of establishing that the doctor's negligent actions caused the patient's
death. 58 Thus, under the aU-or-nothing approach, the plaintiff would
receive no recovery, even though the doctor has clearly engaged in some
negligence and harmed the patient in some real way by the
misdiagnosis. 59
Under the loss of a chance approach, the critical distinction is how
the court identifies the interest that has been destroyed. 60 Whereas the
interest thought to be harmed in the aU-or-nothing approach is the life of
56.
Put slightly differently, the question would be whether the doctor's
negligence was a "but for" cause of the plaintiffs injury. See King, supra note 5, at
1355, 1367 ("[Tlhe ali-or-nothing ... rule denies compensation for the loss of a notbetter-than-even chance of avoiding some adverse result.").
51.
See id. "Damages in personal injury tort actions are traditionally awarded
in a single lump sum that is intended fully to compensate the plaintiff for all past and
future consequences of the tort." /d. at 1370. Consequently, in valuing the life of the
deceased patient, a court will have to consider such factors as life expectancy (based on
such factors as age and health), loss of future earnings, and injury caused to others by
the loss of that person's companionship (that is, consortium). See id. at 1382.
Moreover, the prospect of such future losses must be proven with "reasonable
certainty." /d. at 1371. "Reasonable certainty," in turn, is defined as lying
"somewhere between speculation and actual certainty." /d.
58.
To reiterate, this is because preponderance of the evidence (more than 50%
likelihood) is the standard of proof in most civil actions. See Wax, supra note 5, at
1212.
59.
See King, supra note 5, at 1373. This characterization assumes, of course,
that the patient actually died. For a discussion on the difference between lost chance
claims and increased risk claims depending upon whether the patient has died as a result
of the negligent misdiagnosis, see infra note 88.
See King, supra note 5, at 1370.
60.
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the patient (that is, the ultimate harm), lost chance theory focuses
instead on the loss of opportunity of survival by the patient (that is, an
intermediate harm). 61 Under lost chance theory, therefore, the causation
inquiry devolves into a more easily satisfied inquiry: whether the
plaintiff can establish by the preponderance of the evidence that the
doctor's negligent malpractice caused the destruction of a certain degree
of chance that the patient had at survival. 62 In most cases of this type,
the answer to this refined causation question will be "yes."
What remains, then, is the valuation inquiry; that is, once one
re,:ognizes that the loss of a chance is a cognizable interest for which
redress may be sought, one must decide how to go about valuing that
interest. 63 Initially, in valuing the extent of the loss, the pre injury
condition or preexisting condition of the victim should be taken into
account. 64 To do this, the court simply takes the difference between the
chance of survival prenegligence and the chance of survival
postnegligence and then multiplies this figure by the value of the
individual's life had she lived. 65 To be more concrete, if the patient's
life was valued at $100,000 and the loss of opportunity is quantified as
30% (40% prenegligence chance minus 10% postnegligence chance),
61.
See id.
62.
/d. at 1394 ("[W]hile the loss of a not-better-than-even chance of avoiding
some adverse result should be a compensable loss, it still must be established that the
defendant caused the destruction of that chance."). In other words, "the all-or-nothing
idea may continue to be applied to causation even if it is abandoned for the purposes of
valuation." /d. at 1395; see also Truckor, supra note 17, at 358. This crucial point
appears to be the most difficult distinction to grasp for opponents of the lost chance
approach. See, e.g., Weigand, supra note 9, at 301 ("The effect of the [theory of
recovery] is that it alters the traditional 'more likely than not' burden of proof."); see
also Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371, 374 (S.C. 1995) ("We are persuaded that the
'the loss of chance doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the requisite degree of medical
certitude necessary to establish a causal link between the injury of a patient and the
tonious conduct of a physician.'") (emphasis added) (quoting Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868
S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn. 1993)).
See King, supra note 5, at 1381.
63.
/d. at 1356, 1385. In this scenario, the preexisting condition could be
64.
defined as "a disease, condition, or force that has become sufficiently associated with the
victim to be factored into the value of the interest destroyed, and that has become so
before the defendant's conduct has reached a similar stage." /d. at 1357 (citing
WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §52, at 321-22 (4th ed. 1971)).
65.
This approach is based on the "conjunction principle." See King, supra
note 5, at 1382, 1389 ("A better method of valuation would measure a compensable
chance as the percentage probability by which the defendant's tortious conduct
diminished the likelihood of achieving some more favorable outcome."). The reason
why the calculation works in this manner is because "'mathematical probability obeys a
multiplicative conjunction principle, whereby the probability that two independent events
both occur is equal to the mathematical product of their individual probabilities.'" /d. at
1388 (quoting L.J. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 51-52 (1977)); see also
id. at 1389 ("The conjunction principle should be an indispensable feature of the
valuation process.").
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then the plaintiff should be able to recover $30,000 under these
circumstances. This number more closely represents the harm caused
by the doctor's misdiagnosis. 66
The advantage of this outcome in not-better-than-even-chance cases
is that the plaintiff will not be overcompensated unnecessarily for the
value of her remaining life when the cancer in all probability would
have killed her anyway. 67 At the same time, the patient is not
undercompensated, although the doctor's actions may not have literally
caused her death, because the doctor's action did make the patient's
death more likely, and the chance of avoiding that adverse consequence
should be quantified in some manner. 68 Concerns of fairness also
counsel for an approach that provides some recovery for the patient's
lost chance of survival because it is the doctor's negligence after all that
has made it impossible to determine with any certainty what would have

66.
Some commentators have described a different type of valuation analysis
based on the "increase of relative risk" or "attributable risk" for lost chance cases in the
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 253-54 (1999)
medical malpractice context.
(describing the increase of the relative risk model); Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at
28 n.88) (concluding that the attributable risk calculation provides clarity by converting
loss-of-a-chance claims into evaluations of relative risk); see also Aaron D. Twerski &
Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in lnfonned Consent: Comparing Physicians to
Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 28 n.68 ( 1999) (applying the relative risk model to
informed consent claims). Under these approaches, the fact finder seeks to determine
the likelihood that the doctor's negligence caused the patient's ultimate injury. See
Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 27) (noting that an attributable risk of 53% establishes
that "the defendant's negligence probably caused the ultimate injury"). But, as the
Supreme Court of New Mexico has rightly pointed out:
[U]nder the lost-chance theory, the patient does not allege that the
malpractice caused his or her entire injury. Rather, the claim is that the
health care provider's negligence reduced the chance of avoiding the injury
actually sustained. Thus, it is that chance in and of itself-the lost
opportunity of avoiding the presenting problem and achieving a better
result-that becomes the item of value for which the patient seeks
compensation.
Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1283 (N.M. 1999) (citations omitted). In short, both
the relative risk and attributable risk methods focus on the ultimate injury rather than the
lost opportunity, and therefore, represent just another method of proving traditional tort
causation. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 32, 36) (recognizing this criticism to
his approach, but suggesting that the attributable risk approach will limit the cases in
which loss of chance analysis has to be utilized in the first place). In this sense, these
types of analyses are not properly categorized as loss of chance approaches to tort
recovery.
See King, supra note 5, at 1387.
67.
See id. at 1377. As King wrote:
68.
The ali-or-nothing approach to loss of a chance ... subverts the deterrence
objectives of tort law by denying recovery for the effects of conduct that
causes statistically demonstrable losses. By placing such losses outside tort
law, the ali-or-nothing approach distorts the loss-assigning role of that law.
!d.
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happened absent the negligence. 69 All in all, King asserted that his
approach of valuing the interest harmed by the defendant's conduct best
supported the loss allocation and deterrence goals of tort law. 70

C.

Criticisms Surrounding the Lost Chance Approach

Although lost chance theory can claim the advantages discussed in
the preceding Section, criticisms of this approach abound and only
fourteen states (at the time of the writing of this Article) have clearly
adopted a lost chance theory in the medical malpractice context. 71 The
criticisms of the lost chance approach can be categorized into two main
groups: (1) the inevitable problems surrounding the valuation of a loss
of a chance and subsequent jury confusion on the remedial issues to be
decided; 72 and (2) the lack of a principled basis for limiting application
of loss of a chance to a certain range of cases. 73
First, with regard to the concern that valuing these losses of chance
is incredibly complex, it might be true to an extent that to put a value on
such opportunities may be little more than an elaborate, arbitrary
guessing game. 74 Moreover, as confusing as civil litigation is today for
69.
See id. at 1378.
See id. at 1381 (arguing that the ali-or-nothing approach "undermines the
70.
loss-assigning function of tort law by improperly externalizing significant costs of
various enterprises").
71.
These fourteen states are: Arizona (Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp.,
Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984)); Indiana (Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535,
539-41 (Ind. 2000)); Iowa (Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 331-32 (Iowa
1998)); Kansas (Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 184-87 (Kan. 1994)); Louisiana
(Gordon v. Willis Knighton Med. Ctr., 661 So. 2d 991, 999-1001 (La. Ct. App.
1995)); Missouri (Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 683-86 (Mo. 1992));
Nevada (Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 591-93 (Nev. 1991)); New
Hampshire (Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103, 1106 (N.H. 2001)); New Jersey (Scafadi v.
Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 405-06 (N.J. 1990)); New Mexico (Albens, 975 P.2d at 128283); Ohio (Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484-85
(Ohio 1996)); Oklahoma (McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 474-77
(Okla. 1987)); Washington (Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 477); and Wyoming (McMackin v.
Johnson City Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094, 1100 (Wyo. 2003)). Although Michigan
(Falcon v. Mem'l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990)), and South Dakota (Jorgensen
v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 370-71 (S.D. 2000)) initially adopted lost chance theory
judicially, the theory has now been legislatively abrogated in these states in the medical
malpractice context. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2912a(b)(2) (2000); S.D.
CODE ANN. § 20-9-1 (Lexis Supp. 2002).
72.
See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3) (suggesting that lost chance
theory mathematical calculations may pose too great of a challenge for both litigants and
decision-makers).
73.
Moore, supra note 13, at 214.
See Fischer, supra note 9, at 621 (maintaining that the application of lost
74.
chance theory may lead to "widely speculative damages" as a result of little evidence
concerning the magnitude of the loss of chance); Wax, supra note 5, at 1224 ("A
probabilistic rule that requires assigning a precise probability to the elements ... that
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the average juror, the last thing we need, the argument goes, is a further
complication of the issues in dispute. 75 Be that as it may, these types of
conjectures also occur both in normal causation analysis 76 and in the
comparative negligence setting, 77 and yet juries are commonly asked to
rely on their innate sense of fairness and common sense. 78 ln any event,
using probability analysis to engage in transparene9 loss valuations is
still preferable to maintaining the use of the aU-or-nothing approach with
its harsh, arbitrary, and unfair results. 80
contribute to any workplace decision would strain the fact-finding capability of a liability
system to the breaking point."); cf Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1377 (1971) (arguing that "the
costs of attempting to integrate mathematics into the factfinding process of a legal trial
outweigh the benefits").
See Truckor, supra note 17, at 364 (observing that lost chance theory is
75.
confusing to juries and statistics can be easily manipulated by experts); see also Fennell
v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213-14 (Md. 1990) (refusing to adopt lost
chance theory because of concern about misuse of "unreliable, misleading, easily
manipulated, and confusing" statistical information). Nevertheless, as discussed below,
the difficulty of calculating probabilities may be somewhat assuaged in the employment
discrimination eontext where judges will be primarily responsible for calculating lost
chance values. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
See Jorgensen, 616 N.W.2d at 371 (maintaining that the fact that lost
76.
chance doctrine relies on statistical evidence "in order to assign a value to the lost
chance" does not make the theory more speculative because "such use of mathematical
calculations is already necessary under traditional standards of causation" to show that
the plaintiff once enjoyed a greater than even chance of surviving), abrogated by
legislative amendment, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1.
77.
Some may argue that comparing lost chance analysis to comparative
negligence analysis is inapt because lost chance deals with probabilities about some
occurrence in the real world, while comparative fault involves a normative assessment
and, therefore, has no objective measure (the author would like to thank Professor
Michael D. Green for sharing his views on this particular topic). Although I agree with
Green's view of the two concepts, nevertheless, both analyses are similar in requiring
apportionments that would appear to permit a plaintiff to recover without proving that
the defendant's negligence more probably than not caused her injury. See Noah, supra
note 2 (manuscript at 25) ("[N]ow that many courts fully apportion damages among
litigants according to their share of responsibility for an injury, the loss-of-a-chance
theory as an issue of valuation rather than causation no longer looks so terribly
radical.").
See Truckor, supra note 17 at 366 ("Juries are typically permitted to rely
78.
on their own intuition and experience in calculating damages in negligence
cases .... ").
79.
By transparency, I mean the basic proposition that things go better when
processes are open. See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Transparency, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG (Dec.
21,
2003),
at http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/
2003 12 01 Isolum archive.html#107201605073347259.
-so:- -Fischef. supra note 9, at 640 ("It is better that plaintiff recover something
on the basis of the best estimate possible, even if it is based on averages, than that she
recover nothing."); King, supra note 5, at 1385, 1387 ("[l]n spite of its unavoidable
inexactness, the compensation of lost chances will introduce a substantial higher level of
precision and, therefore, validity into the loss-assigning process."); see also Aagaard,
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Second, some commentators and jurists have argued that in order
for lost chance theory to be viable, it is necessary to develop limiting
principles that restrict its application. Such limitation is necessary, it is
argued, so that lost chance theory does not lead to a mad rush to the
courthouse and to an even more foreboding form of liability for
employers, which may lead to unintended consequences, including more
restrictive hiring and promotion practices. 81 Although these concerns
certainly have resonance, lost chance theory can be properly limited by
applying a de minimis threshold. For instance, one possible limiting
standard would be to restrict loss of chance recoveries to plaintiffs who
had at least a 10% chance of receiving a job prior to the employer's
discriminatory conduct. 82 Such an approach would certainly address
concerns regarding "flooding the courts with speculative cases. " 83 In
any event, the issue concerning whether there should be a de minimis
exception to lost chance theory is separate from whether lost chance
theory should be utilized at all. 84 As Judge Posner wrote in Doll v.
Brown in 1996:

supra note 49, at 1336; Truckor, supra note 17, at 361.
See Moore, supra note 13, at 214 (observing that some courts have limited
81.
the lost chance approach to cases of serious injury or death, or also requiring that the
loss of a chance be substantial or significimt); see also Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206 ("To avoid
flooding the courts with speculative cases, the lost chance to be actionable should no
doubt exceed a de minimis threshold.") (citations omitted).
82.
There is nothing magical about the 10% threshold selected, although this
number has heen found to be "substantial" as a matter of law by at least one court. See
Pipe v. Hamilton, 56 P.3d 823, 829 (Kan. 2002). As the Supreme Court of Kansas
stated in Pipe: "Pipe contends a 10 percent chance of survival is more than a trifling
matter and is something that Kansas public policy supports as being recognized as
substantial. We agree. As a matter of law, a 10 percent loss of chance cannot be said to
be token or de minimis." /d.; see also Moore, supra note 13, at 214, 215 n.lOl (noting
that some courts have sought to limit the lost chance theory by requiring that the
percentage lost be substantial or significant and recommending that courts specify a
range of percentages that qualify as substantial). But see Perez, 805 P.2d at 592
(observing that a 10% loss of chance would probably not qualify as a substantial loss of
chance under the doctrine).
Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206. It may be said here that it is unlikely that such a
83.
mad rush to the courthouse would be caused by a pure loss of chance theory as the
smallness of potential awards would not give individual plaintiffs enough incentive to
pursue such awards. On the other hand, if a class action attorney brings a big enough
class made up of plaintiffs each having less than a 1 % chance of recovery, the incentive
may be there for the lawyer to bring the claim if he can convince enough potential
plaintiffs, and in particular a good lead plaintiff, to pursue the action. This latter
scenario actually suggests that there should be a de minimis level of chance that must be
exceeded before a case is considered appropriate for the lost chance approach.
84.
See, e.g., Delaney, 873 P.2d at 185-86 (recognizing a lost chance theory
of recovery, while at the same time disapproving of lost chance recovery for "token or
de minimis" losses of chance).
HeinOnline -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 762 2005

2005:747

A Public Interest Model

763

To avoid flooding the courts with speculative cases, the lost
chance to be actionable should no doubt exceed a de minimis
threshold .... But that is a detail which, important as it is for
keeping the concept of the lost chance within reasonable
bounds, does not qualify the essential soundness of the
method. 85
D.

The Herskovits Case: A Medical Malpractice Application
of the Lost Chance Theory

The Supreme Court of Washington adopted the loss of a chance
remedial approach in 1983 in the seminal case of Herskovits. 86 In that
case, the court was called on to decide whether an estate could maintain
an action for professional negligence based on the failure to timely
diagnose the decedent's lung cancer. 87 As in the hypothetical example
presented above, the estate could show that the defendants' negligence
caused a decrease in the likelihood of the decedent surviving the cancer,
Specifically, the
but could not establish "but for" liability. 88
misdiagnosis of the decedent's lung cancer caused a 14% percent
reduction (from 39% to 25%) in the chance of survival. 89
In an interesting division of opinions, the supreme court, sitting en
bane, ruled in favor of the plaintiff six to three. 90 The lead opinion, in
which only two justices joined, found that "medical testimony of a
reduction of chance of survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is
sufficient evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the
jury. " 91 Thus, these two judges, following the so-called "increased
85.
75 F. 3d at 1206 (citations omitted).
86.
664 P.2d at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring).
87.
Id. (Pearson, J., concurring).
88.
ld. (Pearson, J., concurring).
89.
See id. at 475 (Pearson, J., concurring).
90.
See id. at 479, 487 (Pearson, J., concurring).
/d. at 479 (Pearson, J ., concurring). It appears that the lead opinion is
91.
actually talking about cause-in-fact or factual cause (that is, "but for" cause), rather than
proximate cause (that is, reasonable foreseeability).
See Joseph H. King, Jr.,
"Reduction of Likelihood" Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of Loss-of-a-Chance
Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REv. 491, 498-99 (1998). Of course, Herskovits is not alone
in falling into this confusion. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note
9, § 26 cmt. a ("Both because it is not well-entrenched and because of the importance of
distinguishing clearly between 'factual cause' and 'proximate cause,' this Restatement
employs different terminology to address these two requirements for liability in tort.");
Bert Black, A New Metaphor for Clarifying the Difference Between Cause-in-Fact and
Proximate Cause, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 159 (2000) (discussing new methods for
overcoming the general confusion between the tort concepts of cause-in-fact and
proximate cause); see also Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1735, 1764 n.l21 (1985) (maintaining that "confusion [between cause-in-fact and
proximate cause] now pervades the fifth edition of Prosser's hornbook").
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risk" approach, 92 improperly conflated the causation and valuation
inquiry as King predicted many courts would continue to do. 93
Rather than defining the injury as a loss of a chance at survival,
which the defendant clearly caused, 94 the lead decision improperly
defined the interest harmed in terms of the actual loss of decedent's
life, 95 making it nearly impossible to establish that the defendants caused
the decedent's harm. 96 Nevertheless, the lead decision used the
"increased risk" doctrine to resurrect the plaintiff's case. 97 Stating that
it is not for the "wrongdoer, who put the possibility of recovery beyond
realization, to say afterward that the result was inevitable, " 98 the lead
opinion permits the issue of causation to go to the jury to determine
whether the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of a "significant"
chance of recovery, and thereby allows the jury to make the step from
increased risk to causation. 99 Consequently, the lead decision in
Herskovits speaks in the language of causation and does not even
mention the separate concept of valuation or King's lost chance
theory. 100
92.
Under the "increased risk" approach under section 323 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, courts focus on defendants who have negligently rendered aid and
consequently have increased the risk of harm to those they are trying to assist. See
Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 476; see also Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 9) ("Some
courts even apply the [loss of a chance] theory in cases where the ultimate injury has not
yet-and may never-become manifest, which amounts to a claim for enhanced future
risk.") (citing Andrew R. Klein, A Model for Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1173 (1999)). Nevertheless, many look at increased risk cases
with more skepticism in general than lost chance cases, arguing that a plaintiff should
only bring such a case once the future harm actually materializes. See Aagaard, supra
note 49, at 1343-44. Additionally, the comments to the new section 26 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Hann, state that reliance on section
323 is misplaced in the lost chance context because "[section 323]'s placement in Topic
7, entitled 'Duties of Affirmative Action,' reveals that it addresses the question of the
existence of a duty and its scope for a person who undertakes to protect another from
harm." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 26 cmt. n.
93.
See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
94.
The parties stipulated for purposes of appeal that defendants "failed to
diagnose [the decedent's] cancer on his first visit to the hospital and proximately caused
[a] 14 percent reduction in his chances of survival." Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 475.
95.
"The ultimate question raised here is whether the relationship between the
increased risk of hann and [the decedent's] death is sufficient to hold [defendant]
responsible." /d. at 476 (emphasis added).
96.
The parties had also stipulated that the decedent had less than a 50%
chance of survival at all times. Id. at 475.
97.
The approach of the majority is consistent with one of King's criticisms of
the traditional ali-or-nothing approach: it "creates pressure to manipulate and distort
other rules affecting causation and damages in an attempt to mitigate perceived
injustices." /d. at 487 (Pearson, 1., concurring) (citing King, supra note 5, at 1377).
98.
/d. at 476 (citations omitted).
99.
/d. at476,478.
100. The lead opinion does use the terminology "loss of a chance." /d. at 478.
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On the other hand, the concurring opinion, written by Justice
Vernon Pearson, and joined by three other justices, represents the first
expressed endorsement of King's lost chance theory . 101 First, the
opinion, consistent with lost chance theory, defines the injury caused by
the defendant as "the reduction of [the decedent's] chance of surviving
the cancer from which he suffered. " 102 Second, having defined the
injury differently, the concurring opinion also recognizes that "[w]hat
caused a loss ... should be a separate question from what the nature
and extent of the loss are. " 103 Third, the concurrence concludes by
stating that it "would hold that plaintiff has established a prima facie
issue of proximate cause by producing testimony that defendant probably
caused substantial reduction in [decedent's] chance of survival. " 104
Finally, and albeit in a footnote, the concurring opinion finds the
statistics, showing a loss of a 14% chance of survival by the defendant's
action, most appropriate for determining the amount of damages, rather
than as a method of establishing causation. 105
Interestingly, the Herskovits concurrence appears to adopt a
modified lost chance theory. In reviewing cases cited by the plaintiff,
Justice Pearson notes that three of the cases involve instances in which
the chance of survival was greater than 50%, and that in such cases the
injury is properly recognized as the death of the decedent. 106 That being
said, the concurring opinion is not clear as to why it rejects King's
"pure" version of lost chance theory, which would have instead required

However, it seems to be improperly conflating the increased risk doctrine with lost
chance theory. See id. (Pearson, J., concurring). Whereas increased risk doctrine is
still based on a causation inquiry and permits the jury to make "[t]he step from the
increased risk to causation," id. , (Pearson, J., concurring) lost chance theory focuses on
redefining the interest harmed and then valuing that interest. See Aagaard, supra note
49, at 1344 ("Unlike the increased-risk claim, which seeks compensation for the
possibility that an as-yet unmanifested injury will occur in the future, the harm in a lost
chance case already has materialized.").
101. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring) (explicitly stating
that this conclusion to adopt lost chance theory was based on the "thoughtful discussion"
of King).
102. See id. at 481 (Pearson, J., concurring).
103. /d. at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring) (quoting King, supra note 5, at 1363).
104. /d. at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring). Again, the concurrence confuses
causation-in-fact with proximate cause. See supra note 92.
105. /d. at 475; id. at 487 n.2 (Pearson, J., concurring). As far as determining
the amount of damages, Justice Vernon Pearson does no more than cite King's
hypothetical lost chance calculation for guidance. See id. at 487 (Pearson, J.,
concurring) (citing King, supra note 5, at 1382). It is also interesting to note that
permitting a 14% reduction in chance is consistent with setting the de minimis threshold
at 10% as discussed above. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
106. Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 485 (Pearson, J ., concurring).
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lost chance theory principles to be applied across the board even to
better-than-even-chance cases. 107
In any event, after Herskovits, a number of courts adopted the lost
chance theory in the medical malpractice context. 108 Moreover, the lost
chance theory has found some resonance among scholarly commentators
and courts in such areas as wrongful life jurisprudence. 109 That being
said, almost all courts that have adopted lost chance analysis in the
medical malpractice context have generally refused to extend it outside
of those confines. 110 Recently, however, the Seventh Circuit has sought
to break that trend by introducing lost chance theory into the
employment discrimination context.
II.

THE INTRODUCTION OF "PURE" LOST CHANCE THEORY INTO
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION

It would be another thirteen years after the Herskovits decision until
lost chance theory would be applied to probabilistic injuries in the
employment discrimination context. 111 Judge Posner first suggested this
approach in the case of Doll. 112

107. See id. (Pearson, J., concurring).
108. See supra note 71.
109. See Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 348-50 (Nev. 1995) (utilizing
the lost chance method to find for the plaintiff in a wrongful life case); Deana A.
Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L. REv. 327, 35658 (2004) (utilizing the lost chance doctrine in a wrongful life context to argue that a
baby's Joss of a chance at a healthier life constitutes a compensable injury).
110. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 10) (providing a Jist of the cases in
which courts applied the lost chance theory to medical malpractice contexts); see also
John C.P. Goldberg, What Clients Are Owed: Cautionary Observations on Lawyers and
Loss of a Chance, 52 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1208-13 (2003) (arguing against expanding the
lost chance theory into the legal malpractice context).
111. But see Paul Speaker, The Application of the Loss of Chance Doctrine in
Class Actions, 21 REv. LlTlG. 345, 354 (2002) (claiming that the lost chance doctrine
had been previously applied to employment discrimination cases, but not referred to in
those courts as "loss of a chance") (citing Hameed v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, 637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980)). Yet, Hameed seems to be
Jess about lost chance theory, and more about another theory of damage apportionment
based on pro rata shares in the class action environment. See Hameed, 637 F.2d at 51921. In this regard, Hameed is a class-wide remedy case utilizing a one-size-fits-all
"mathematical blender," see Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.N.J.
1979), rather than a case seeking to provide individual loss of chance determinations as
the Seventh Circuit attempts to do in the three cases that follow. See infra Parts II.A-C.
112. 75 F.3d 1200.
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Doll v. Brown: A "Theoretical Discussion"113 on Pure Lost Chance

Theory in the Employment Discrimination Context
Charles Doll, a fifty-something electrician at a Veterans
Administration hospital in Illinois, sued the U.S. government for
disability discrimination and for failing to accommodate his disability
under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 114 Specifically,
Doll believed that because of a laryngectomy and tracheotomy stemming
from throat cancer, he was forced to undertake a less desirable job (a
parts and tool attendant) while he recovered, and was thereafter both
refused reinstatement to his original electrician position and was not
considered for a promotion to the electrical foreman position. 115
After the federal district court found in Doll's favor at the
conclusion of a bench trial, 116 it reinstated him to his original,
presickness electrician position. 117 On the issue of whether he would
have been further promoted to the electrical foreman position in the
absence of discrimination, the district court sought to cobble together a
remedial resolution based on the fact that it was unclear whether Doll
would have actually received the foreman position. 118 In this regard, the
court awarded Doll over $61,000 in back pay, 119 and issued declaratory
relief requiring that the Veterans hospital consider Doll for the
electrician foreman position next time it became vacant. 120
On appeal, Judge Posner, writing for a three judge panel of the
Seventh Circuit, 121 came to a rather unexceptional conclusion in vacating
and remanding the district court's remedy. Finding that the case was a
so-called "no-injury case," 122 the court focused on the nature of the
113. Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1016.
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 791; see also Doll, 15 F.3d at 1201.
115. Doll, 15 F.3d at 1201-02.
116. Liability was found against the government on the basis of both disability
discrimination and failure to accommodate the known physical disability of Charles
Doll, a qualified applicant. /d. at 1203.
117. /d. at 1202.
118. /d. at 1205 (outlining Doll's counsel's argument that the district judge
"splitD the difference" in arriving at a remedy for Doll).
119. The back pay award "represent[edl the difference between the salary he
actually received between April 1988 (when the foreman's job went to [the other
applicant]) and the date of trial and the salary he would have received had he been made
foreman then." /d. at 1202.
120. /d. As it turns out, the job became vacant during the litigation, but Doll
was again passed over for the promotion. See id.
121. /d. at 1201. Judges Frank Easterbrook and John Cummings joined Judge
Posner's decision for the court. /d.
122. In a "no-injury case," the plaintiff has proven liability and the defendant
seeks to escape the imposition of damages by establishing by some burden of persuasion
that tbe plaintiff was made no worse off by the discrimination. See id. at 1202 (citing
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 362; Franks, 424 U.S. at 772-73). In contradistinction,
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burden that the defendant must meet in order to escape having to pay
damages or any other forms of relief. 123 Although Judge Posner was
uncomfortable requiring defendants in no-injury cases to meet the clear
and convincing burden of persuasion, the government defendant failed to
properly brief the issue, and he, therefore, could make no ruling on this
issue. 124
On the other major point of contention involving the proper remedy
for failing to promote Doll to the electrical foreman position, Judge
cases outside of the Title VII context may still fall under the Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins framework, meaning that the employer may still avoid liability by establishing
that it would have taken the same decision even in the absence of discrimination. See
Doll, 15 F.3d at 1202-03 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242
(1989)). Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("the 1991 Act"), and its
codification of mixed-motive analysis for Title VII cases, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m),
2000e-5(g)(2)(B), there is an argument that other types of discrimination cases (including
disability cases under the Rehabilitation Act) should also be subject to the 1991 Act's
analysis under which meeting this "same decision" test only goes to decreasing the types
of damages available to a plaintiff, rather than relieving the plaintiff of all liability. See
Doll, 15 F.3d at 1203 (assuming without deciding that Price Waterhouse still applies to
some mixed-motive discrimination cases); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
(setting out the 1991 Act's approach to damages in Title VII mixed-motive cases); Miles
F. Archer, Note, Mullin v. Raytheon Co.: The Threatened Vitality of Disparate Impact
Under the ADEA, 52 ME. L. REv. 149, 156 n.56 (2000) (observing that it is still unclear
whether the mixed-motive provisions of the 1991 Act apply outside of the Title VII
context); Laura C. Marino, Note, A Necessary Tool: The Continuing Debate over the
Viability of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
77 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 649, 654-55 n.33 (2003) (same). A more thorough discussion of
the available remedies in non-Title VII, employment discrimination mixed-motive cases
is beyond the scope of this Article.
123. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1202. One of the significant ways in which
constitutional and statutory torts in the employment discrimination context differ from
the garden-variety medical malpractice or products liability tort is the availability of
affirmative defenses to the defendant once the plaintiff carries her burden by proving
that defendant has engaged in unlawful employment discrimination. See id. (citing
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 362; and Franks, 424 U.S. at 772-73). Even if the
plaintiff proves the employer has violated the law, the case does not end there. Instead,
the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to show that its actions made the
employee no worse off; that is, the employer's actions caused the employee no iqjury.
See id. In such a case, the defendant is not disclaiming liability, but seeking to reduce
damages to a nominal level by arguing in essence that even though unlawful
discrimination occurred, it did not cause any iqjury to the plaintiff. See id.
To those familiar with employment discrimination law, this shifting of the burden
of persuasion is similar to what occurs with the "same decision" test in mixed-motive
analysis, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), or what occurs with the shifting of the
burden of persuasion in the damages phase of Teamsters pattern and practice litigation.
See 431 U.S. at 359 ("By 'demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern
and practice' the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of discrimination against the
individual class members; the burden therefore shifted to the employer 'to prove that
individuals who reapply were not in fact victims of previous hiring discrimination."')
(quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 772).
124. Doll, 15 F.3d at 1203-04, 1207.
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Posner was confused why the district court judge awarded full back pay
to Doll, but nevertheless only ordered that he be considered for a
promotion the next time the electrician foreman position became
available. 125 Instead, he thought that the district court should have either
followed the traditional ali-or-nothing approach and deny all relief to
Doll, or it should have granted full relief, including full back pay along
with either: (1) instatement into the electrical foreman position, or
failing that, (2) front pay relief to place him in approximately the same
position he would have been absent the discrimination. 126 Because the
district judge did not take either approach, Judge Posner vacated the
back pay award and remanded the case back to the district court to
determine the appropriate remedy for Doll. 127
Nevertheless, because the district judge appeared to be torn
between the fact that Doll was unlawfully discriminated against by the
government in applying for the promotion to the foreman position, and
the fact that the evidence suggested that Doll would probably not have
received the foreman position even in the absence of discrimination,
Judge Posner could not resist making another suggestion as to how the
district judge could appropriately "split the difference" in fashioning a
remedy for Doll. 128 Although not required to do so in order to reach the
holding in the case, 129 Judge Posner suggested that the district court
implement lost chance theory by applying the clear and convincing
evidence rule governing the defendant's no-injury defense to
"probabilities as distinct from certainties of loss. " 130
The lost chance theory's focus on probabilities seemed to
correspond perfectly with this type of employment discrimination case,
where "proof of injury is inescapably uncertain. " 131 After explaining the
125. See id. at 1205.
126. See id. ("[R]ather than just ordering the hospital to consider Doll for
appointment to foreman the next time a vacancy arose, [he} should either have ordered
him appointed to the position forthwith ... or awarded him front pay .... The relief
he ordered fell short.").
127. See id. at 1207.
128. ld.
129. Indeed, the lost chance theory had been briefed by neither party, as Judge
Posner candidly admits. See id. at 1206 (observing that, not only did the parties not
raise the lost chance theory in this case, but neither had anyone else to his knowledge).
130. ld. at 1207.
131. ld. at 1205-06. As Judge Posner wrote: "[I]t strikes us as peculiarly
appropriate in employment cases involving competitive promotion [to apply the lost
chance theory]. ln such a case the plaintiffs chances are inherently uncertain because of
the competitive setting." !d. at 1206; see also King, supra note 91, at 495-96
(recognizing the lost chance doctrine's appropriateness in scenarios in which "it is
proven that the defendant's active, tortious conduct probably caused the victim's
materialized injury and the only question is to what extent to reduce damages for that
injury to reflect the likelihood that the victim's preexisting condition would produce
harm independent of the tortious conduct").
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theory's origins in medical. malpractice cases, 132 Judge Posner expressed
his opinion that the theory was "basically sound" and was merely "an
extension of the routine practice in tort cases involving disabling injuries
of discounting lost future earnings by the probability that the plaintiff
would have been alive and working in each of the years for which
damages are sought. " 133 Relying upon King's seminal article, Judge
Posner argued in Doll that what should be compensated in cases
involving "the inescapably probabilistic character of many injuries" is
not the loss of the job itself, but rather the loss of the opponunity to
receive the job because of the employer's unlawful discriminatory
conduct. 134 Compensating plaintiffs on the loss of a chance to obtain a
job was necessary in order to avoid undercompensation and
underdeterrence, on one hand, or overcompensation and overdeterrence,
on the other . 135 And, even though Judge Posner recognized the
somewhat arbitrary nature of saying that someone lost a 25% chance of
obtaining a job, 136 he nevertheless argued that such calculations would
be no different from the calculations juries make all the time when they
apportion fault under a comparative negligence statute. 137
In the end, Judge Posner argued that doing these probability
calculations front and center in order to split the difference in
employment discrimination cases involving inherently uncertain injuries
was far preferable to district court judges splitting the difference as they
saw fit, perhaps based on nothing more than their own gut feelings. 138
Nevertheless, recognizing that the application of lost chance theory to
employment discrimination was an issue of first impression and had not

132. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1205-06.
133. /d. at 1206. Put differently, Judge Posner's approach represents another
application of the conjunction principle. See supra note 65.
134. See 15 F.3d at 1206 (emphasis added).
135. /d. To illustrate his point concerning the inefficient and unjust effects of an
ali-or-nothing approach in these types of employment discrimination cases, Judge Posner
offered the following hypothetical in Doll:
Suppose there were five applicants for one job, the employer discriminated
against four, and all four were equally well qualified, and the fifth got the
job. Would all four of the discriminated-against applicants be entitled to
back pay, one to the job, and the other three to front pay? Obviously not;
yet without the lost-chance concept, which could grant reinstatement to none
of the four and 25 percent front pay to each of them, the employer would get
off scot-free.
/d.

136. !d. at 1206-07.
137. /d. at 1207. For a discussion of the criticisms surrounding the comparative
negligence analogy, see supra note 77.
138. See Doll, 15 F. 3d at 1206; see also supra note 79 (discussing the benefits
of a transparent judicial decision-making process).
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yet been briefed, Judge Posner merely commended this theory in Doll to
the bench and bar for further consideration. 139

B.

Bishop v. Gainer: Cutting an Employment Discrimination Remedial

"Gordian Knot "140
It was not until about two years later that a district court judge took
Judge Posner up on his invitation to apply the lost chance theory to an
employment discrimination dispute. 141 And, it was not until another
three years later in 2001 that the Seventh Circuit sanctioned on appeal
the district court's application of the lost chance theory for probabilistic
injuries in the employment discrimination context. 142
In Bishop, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the district court
judge erred in applying the lost chance remedial theory to determine
monetary damages awards for three prevailing plaintiffs who did not
receive retroactive promotions in a reverse race discrimination case. 143
139. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1207.
140. This terminology was utilized by Judge Terence T. Evans in Bishop v.
Gainer to describe the actions of the district judge, Judge Harry Leinenweber, in
adopting a lost chance approach to a probabilistic injury scenario in the employment
discrimination context. 272 F.3d at 1017. Although the reference to a "Gordian Knot"
literally refers to "[a]n intricate knot tied by King Gordius of Phrygia and cut by
Alexander the Great with his sword after hearing an oracle promise that whoever could
undo it would be the next ruler of Asia," see AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000), available at http://dictionary.reference.
com/search?q=gordian%20knot, it more figuratively refers to "an inextricable
difficulty; and to cut the Gordian knot is to remove a difficulty by bold and energetic
See Datasegment.com Online Dictionary, at http://onlinedictionary.
measures."
datasegment.com/word/gordian+knot (last visited June 26, 2005).
141. See Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1016. The case of Koski v. Gainer was initially
filed against the Illinois State Police in May of 1992. See id. at 1011. In the case,
different groups of white males alleged reverse discrimination under both 42 U.S.C. §
1983 ("Section 1983"), and Title VII, with regard to both hiring and promotion by the
Illinois State Police. See Koski v. Gainer, No. 92-C-3293, 1999 WL 438910, at *1
(N.D. III. June 22, 1999). The promotion discrimination aspects of the case under Title
VII appear to have been decided by the district court at a bench trial in 1998. See
Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1011-12; see also Koski, 1999 WL 438910, at *1 (outlining the
relief received by seven prevailing plaintiffs in the promotion part of the case).
142. See Bishop, 212 F.3d at 1016-17.
143. See id. at 1015. As this was a pattern and practice employment
discrimination case involving systemic disparate treatment, well-established precedent
under the Teamsters-Franks line of cases, see supra note 122, required the defendants to
prove that each of the plaintiffs of the class was not entitled to relief because the plaintiff
had already proven by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had engaged
in an unlawful pattern and practice of employment discrimination. See Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 361. As the Court stated in Teamsters:
If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises from the
[plaintift]'s prima facie case, a trial court may then conclude that a violation
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Each of these three prevailing plaintiffs objected to the application of the
lost chance approach and argued that each of them should have been
awarded the full value of the job for their unlawful discriminatory
treatment. 144
In denying the plaintiffs their requested relief, Judge Terence T.
Evans, writing for the Seventh Circuit majority, first noted that to award
full compensation to all three plaintiffs, especially where two were
competing for the same job, would not only be wrong, but "obviously
wrong. " 145 Harkening back to the hypothetical offered by Judge Posner
in Doll involving multiple candidates for a single promotion, 146 the
Bishop court maintained that the traditional ali-or-nothing approach to
situations such as these would inevitably lead to windfall recoveries for
plaintiffs. 147 Instead, the appellate court agreed with the district court in
using the "tort approach" based on the loss of a chance. 148
Under this approach, the district court calculated the plaintiffs'
damages by assessing their chances of receiving the competitive
promotion in the absence of discrimination. 149 For instance, two of the
three plaintiffs placed third and fourth respectively on a promotion list,
but the person who placed first accepted a different job, and the person
who placed second had been out of the particular district, and therefore,
the court reduced his chances of actually accepting the promotion to
only 25%. 150 Although not fully explaining how he arrived at his
numbers, the district judge found that the plaintiffs who placed third and
fourth on the promotion had a 45% chance and 30% chance of receiving

has occurred and determine the appropriate remedy. Without any further
evidence from the [plaintiff], a court's finding of a pattern or practice
justifies an award of prospective relief.
/d.

144. See Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1015. Nothing in the Teamsters decision,
however, suggests that the relief awarded to individual plaintiffs within a group or class
must be "full" relief. See generally 431 U.S. 324. Indeed, the Teamster Court
observed that a trial court must hold mini-hearings in the damage phase of these cases in
order to award appropriate relief to each member of the class. See id. at 361 ("When
the [class] seeks individual relief for the victims of the discriminatory practice, a district
court must usually conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the trial to
determine the scope of individual relief.").
145. See Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1015-16. As the Bishop court stated: "What
plaintiffs are really complaining about is that they did not each make a full recovery,
which, as we shall see, at least in the case of [two of the plaintiffs], would have caused
the [Illinois State Police] to pay double damages. 'Obviously' not the right result."
146. See supra note 135.
147. Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1016.
148. /d.
149. /d.
150. /d.
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the promotion, respectively, and thus, were entitled to only that
percentage of the value of the job. 151
While the appellate court recognized that lost chance theory
involved "more art than science," 152 it nevertheless approved the theory
for these types of employment discrimination cases, finding that similar
types of calculations are made all the time in other contexts, such as in
comparative negligence cases. 153 Perhaps more importantly, the use of
lost chance theory in this context struck the court as the "likeliest way to
arrive at a just result," and thus, it fully affirmed the lost chance
calculations of the district court. 154
C.

Biondo v. City of Chicago: Applying Lost Chance Theory to
Speculative Future Promotions

Since Doll, and in fact even since Bishop, there has been only a
smattering of cases that have applied the lost chance theory to
employment discrimination cases. 155 Indeed, the author was only able to
find two such cases outside of the Seventh Circuit. 156 Nevertheless, as
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. /d. at 1016-17; see also supra note 77.
154. Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1017.
155. Drews v. Social Dev. Comm., 95 F. Supp. 2d 985, 989 (E.D. Wis. 1998)
(awarding the plaintiff 12.5% of salary and fringe benefits for a better job for which
eight others also applied); Farley v. Miller Fluid Power Corp., No. 94-C-2273, 1997
WL 757863, at *3 (N.D. lll. Nov. 24, 1997) (denying a motion in limine to exclude all
evidence of the plaintiffs alleged lost chance of promotion); Adams v. City of Chicago,
No. 94-C-5727, 1996 WL 137660, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 1996) (concluding that the
plaintiffs' argument, that retroactive promotions are not a plausible remedy for the
injury of denial of an opportunity to compete for a promotion, is not likely to succeed
because of the availability of the lost chance theory); cf. Liebig-Grigsby v. United
States, No. 00-C-4922, 2003 WL 1090272, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2003)
(finding that, when a government employer refused to refer an employee to a
neurosurgeon and the employee lost a 70% to 80% chance of halting further
deterioration of her spinal cord as a result, the employee was entitled to the same
percentage of the total damage award).
156. See Evans v. Potter, 215 F.R.D. 571, 574 (D.S.D. 2003) (applying a
mandatory joinder analysis under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);
Albright v. New Orleans, 208 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640-41 (E.D. La. 2002) (relying on
expert testimony to establish the value of the lost promotion to each plaintiff, and then
multiplied the promotion value by the probability that each plaintiff would have received
the promotion). The court in Evans brought up the interesting question of what to do
when three individuals are denied a promotion in an allegedly unlawfully discriminatory
manner, but only one of these individuals has actually brought a claim. See 215 F.R.D.
at 574. It noted that, if it awarded the plaintiff full recovery, such an award might lead
to inconsistent obligations on the defendant if other courts later found for the other two
individuals who applied for the same job. See id. As such, using Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants sought mandatory joinder of the other potential
plaintiffs as necessary parties. See id. (requiring "'a substantial risk' of inconsistent or
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witnessed by the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Biondo, 157 the
Seventh Circuit remains steadfast in applying the lost chance theory to
probabilistic injuries in employment discrimination cases, even when
such cases involve speculative future promotions.
In Biondo, nineteen firefighters and engineers sued the City of
Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and Title VII for
reverse race discrimination when they were not promoted to the rank of
lieutenant after taking a oeompetitive promotion examination in 1986. 158
They alleged that the City of Chicago had maintained racially segregated
promotion lists, and that in the absence of these lists, they would have
been promoted to lieutenant. 159 Moreover, these plaintiffs maintained
that there was some likelihood that after becoming lieutenants, they
would have sought further promotions to the rank of captain and
battalion chief. 160 After finding in the plaintiffs' favor, the district court
ordered various forms of injunctive relief and utilized the lost chance
method to determine the value of the probabilistic injuries each of these
firefighters and engineers suffered. 161
Although neither the parties nor the Seventh Circuit quarreled with
the central approach of the district court in using the lost chance theory
to determine the value of these probabilistic injuries, some of the results
arrived at by the juries 162 were baffling. 163 Consequently, Judge Frank
Easterbrook, writing for the appellate panel, reevaluated the evidence on
his way to vacating the damage award with instructions for the district
court to follow on remand. 164
First, Judge Easterbrook pointed out that all of the plaintiffs should
receive 100% of the value of the lieutenant promotions, retroactive to
when they would have received the promotion in the absence of the

multiple obligations before joinder is necessary") (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2)(ii)).
In the end, the court ordered joinder of the other potential plaintiffs in order to avoid
posing inconsistent obligations on the defendant. See id. Unfortunately, there is no
further published history of this case concerning what happened after the mandatory
joinder was required.
157. 382 F.3d 680.
158. 382 F.3d at 682-83.
159. /d. at 683.
160. !d. at 684-85.
161. /d. at 688. As the court stated: "The City does not dispute the district
court's central approach: asking the jury to determine the probability that being held
back in 1986 cost the plaintiffs later chances for advancement. This 'loss of a chance'
method is the best way to handle probabilistic injuries." /d.
162. Two different juries actually heard the case. See id. at 683, 685.
163. For instance, with respect to one of the plaintiffs, the jury determined that
he had a 90% chance of becoming a captain and a 100% chance of becoming a battalion
chief, even though one must become a captain before they are eligible for the battalion
chief position. See id. at 688.
164. See id. at 690-92.
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discriminatory selection method. 165 Unlike a situation in which there are
multiple candidates for just one position, 166 this case provided an
example in which the first promotion was never in doubt in the absence
of the racially segregated selection test; but, it was unclear whether, and
how successful, these same firefighters and engineers would have been
if they applied for later promotions to the captain and thereafter, to the
battalion chief positions. 167 Judge Easterbrook estimated that promoted
lieutenants in the Chicago Fire Department had about a 33% chance of
subsequently attaining the captain position. 168 He also calculated that
once becoming a captain, firefighters had a 41% chance of then
becoming a battalion chief. 169 As a result, he calculated the chance of
rising from the lieutenant position to the battalion chief position at
14%Y0 Overall, Judge Easterbrook concluded his damage calculation
165. Because there were enough positions available for all plaintiffs to receive
promotions to the lieutenant position, and all would have been promoted absent the use
of racially discriminatory selection criteria, each plaintiff had a 100% chance of
receiving the promotion absent discrimination. See id. at 688 ("[I]f a person would have
had a 25% chance of promotion from lieutenant to captain, then preventing that person
from bci:oming a lieutenant should lead to a remedy equal to 100% of the benefits of
being a lieutenant plus 25% of the incremental benefits of being a captain."). Judge
Easterbrook observed, however, that this calculation will only hold true if we are to
assume that all of the plaintiffs are risk neutral. See id. Although he admits that such
plaintiffs would likely be risk averse and pay to reduce the risk (so that the proper award
should be something less than the actuarial value), for simplicity sake he continues on
with his risk neutral assumption. See id.
166. This was the case in both Bishop and Doll. See supra Part II.A-B.
167. Biondo, 382 F.3d. at 690. Additionally, the plaintiffs made their lost
chance showing more difficult by failing to provide comparative evidence of how
similarly situated white firefighters and engineers who were promoted to lieutenant
subsequently fared on later the captain and battalion chief competitive examinations. /d.
at 689. Instead, the plaintiffs merely adduced evidence about their education and
experience and the fact that they loved their work, were committed to the fire
department, strived to succeed, and studied hard for the promotion tests. /d. Judge
Easterbrook found that this evidence, however, did not permit the quantification of the
chance lost by not being initially promoted in 1986. /d. Although I agree with Judge
Easterbrook concerning most of this evidence, testimony concerning education and
experience can be helpful in quantifying the chance a discriminated-against plaintiff had
in obtaining a desired position. See infra Part IV.B.2.
168. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. Judge Easterbrook appeared to be following the
analytical framework established by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections in which the court stated that, "[i]n an
ideal situation, where the data is available and the parties cooperative, a court could
determine what would be the progression of an average worker with the basic
qualifications possessed by the injured party." 5 F.3d 186, 189 (6th Cir. 1993).
Moreover, "[t]he burden of proof would then be on the defendant to prove that the
plaintiff would have performed more poorly than the average and the burden of proof
would be on the plaintiff to show that she would have performed better than that
average." /d.
169. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690.
110. The I4% figure is arrived at by applying the conjunction principle and
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by stating that "[o]n remand each of the 13 [plaintiffs who have stopped
short of captain] is entitled to all of the benefits he would have received
from a timely promotion to lieutenant, plus 33% of the benefits available
from promotion to captain. " 171 Additionally, for the ten plaintiffs who
the jury believed had a chance of achieving the battalion chief level,
they would receive an additional 14% of the value of the battalion chief
position benefits. 172
Thus, Biondo represents yet another example of how the lost
chance method may be utilized to determine difficult remedial issues. 173
But, unlike the Doll and Bishop decisions, which involved only the
determination of the probability of multiple candidates receiving a
promotion for one available job, Biondo provides a future promotions
scenario with the additional complication of determining the future
career paths of many plaintiffs who have been denied advancement in
the midst of their careers. 174 Although the "average worker" followed
by Judge Easterbrook 175 in Biondo is less than perfect, especially in the
absence of specific comparative evidence, its calculations nevertheless
appear to provide a skilled approximation of the probabilistic injuries
suffered by these types of plaintiffs. 176
multiplying the initial chance of becoming a captain (33%) by the subsequent chance of
becoming a battalion chief (41 %). See id.; see also supra note 65. Again, being able to
recover for a 14% Joss of chance (as in Herskovits) is consistent with the 10% de
minimis threshold argued for in this Article. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying
text.
171. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690.
172. See id. Moreover, because "[al change in the promotion probabilities and
dates requires everything else to be redone," Judge Easterbrook also instructed the
district court on remand to recalculate the equitable remedies (including back pay, front
pay, and entitlement to seniority and pensions), and hold a new trial limited to the
recalculation of "back pay and damages for emotional distress on the assumption that
each of the plaintiffs who has yet to reach captain lost a 33% chance of promotion by
2002." /d. But see infra note 240 (asserting that lost chance analysis should not be part
of the compensatory damage analysis undertaken by the jury in an employment
discrimination case).
173. See Biondo, 382 F.3d. at 690 (using the lost chance method to determine
damages). But see United States v. City of Miami, 195 F.3d 1292, 1300-02 (11th Cir.
1999) (addressing a similar promotion case in which the court avoided a quagmire of
hypothetical judgments associated with the lost chance theory and instead awarded a
class-wide remedy, giving each eligible plaintiff in each ranking level a pro rata share).
174. See Griffin, 5 F.3d at 189 (discussing the difficulty of determining the
appropriate relief in cases in which an initial unlawful discriminatory employment action
may cost the plaintiff chances for later career advancement).
175. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. The "average worker" approach was actually
first suggested by Judge Danny Boggs of the Sixth Circuit in Griffin. See 5 F.3d at 189.
176. As will be discussed below, the ideal situation for lost chance analysis in
the employment discrimination context would permit a fact finder to engage in individual
fact-finding to approximate as closely as possible the chance the individual had to obtain
a position prior to the discrimination. See infra notes 231-38 and accompanying text.
The "average worker" test, however, may be useful in cases like Biondo as a substitute
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Ill.

CONSIDERATIONS ADVISING AGAINST ADOPTING PURE LOST
CHANCE THEORY IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES

Although Doll involved language contemplating the utilization of a
pure version of lost chance theory in the employment discrimination
context, 177 neither Bishop nor Biondo consider the efficacy of pure lost
chance theory in this context. 178 Consequently, it is necessary to
consider whether courts in the future should adopt a pure lost chance
theory to calculate the value of probabilistic injuries in the employment
discrimination context. This Article posits that the adoption of such an
approach would be inappropriate for two primary reasons. First, from a
statutory standpoint, pure lost chance theory primarily satisfies the
private, "make whole" relief goal of employment discrimination law,
while failing to give sufficient attention to the public interests that such
laws are also intended to serve. Second, from a prudential standpoint,
the pure version of lost chance gives zealous defense counsel an
additional opportunity to confuse the remedial issues for the fact finder,
and by extension, may significantly add to the administrative costs
associated with the litigation of such disputes. 179

A.

Statutory Concerns Regarding Pure Lost Chance Theory

Although allowing defendant employers the ability to set off
employment discrimination awards by the probability that the plaintiff
would have received the job in better-than-even-chance cases appears to
be a logical extension of themes underlying lost chance theory, 180 under
closer scrutiny, it is not compatible with one of the central purposes of
when there are no suitable individual comparators, or in class action situations in which
it would be too expensive and time consuming to engage in mini-hearings to determine
the exact loss of chance suffered by each member of a voluminous class. See ROBERT
BELTON & DIANNE AVERY, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EQUAUTY IN THE WORKPLACE 795-96 (6th ed. 1999).
177. See supra Part Il.A.
178. This is because neither Bishop nor Biondo involved fact scenarios in which
the plaintiffs had more than a 50% chance of receiving a promotion, as Doll speculated
might be the situation in some circumstances. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206.
179. See Ellis, supra note 23, at 372. As Lori Ellis wrote:
It seems likely that in jurisdictions that have already adopted loss of chance
for cases below fifty-one percent, the defense bar may advocate extending
loss of chance to better-than-even cases in an effort to limit damages to the
value of the 'lost chance' rather than full damages for wrongful death.
/d.
180. See King, supra note 5, at 1387 (advocating the application of lost chance
theory to better-than-even-chance cases); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 66, at 253
(advocating the adoption of a pure form of lost chance theory in the tort context to avoid
systematic overcompensation of plaintiffs and overdeterrence of defendants).
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employment discrimination law. 181 As discussed above, Title VII and
other similar employment discrimination laws were enacted by Congress
not only to provide a private remedy for those unlawfully discriminated
against, but also, and perhaps most importantly, to serve the public goal
of eliminating unlawful discrimination from the American economy. 182
In order to take into account both the private and the public statutory
purposes of employment discrimination laws, courts should be able to
overcompensate plaintiffs with "punitive-type" equitable relief in cases
in which a better-than-even chance of proving discrimination has been
established in order to satisfy the larger public interest goals of
employment discrimination law. 183
Punitive-type equitable relief does not mean the traditional
monetary punitive damages that have been available for intentional
discrimination under Title VII since Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 (" 1991 Act"). 184 Rather, punitive-type equitable relief in
181. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 421 (establishing eradication of
discrimination throughout the economy as one of the central statutory purposes of Title
VII).
182. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 292; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (discussing the broad public purposes of Title VII in the
voluntary affirmative action context); Franks, 424 U.S. at 771; Albemarle Paper, 422
U.S. at 421.
183. See Franks, 424 U.S. at 764 ("[F]ederal courts are empowered to fashion
such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution,
making whole insofar as possible the victims of racial discrimination in hiring."); see
also Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294-95 (2002) ("[W]hile punitive damages benefit the
individual employee, they also serve an obvious public function in deterring future
violations."). This approach for providing punitive-like equitable relief in lost chance
cases in the employment discrimination context should be viewed as consistent with
Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell's basic point that punitive damages
make sense from a deterrence standpoint "if, and only if, an injurer has a chance of
escaping liability for the harm he causes." See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869, 874 (1998). Here,
unless we utilize punitive-type equitable relief, there is a significant chance that the
public-regarding aspects of employment discrimination law wiii go unfulfilled. See id.
at 939-40 (suggesting that, although foreseeing some problems, "if there is a component
of harm that otherwise would be omitted, a policy of including it in the form of punitive
damages would seem to be beneficial"). And, although Polinsky and Shavell refer to
these monetary awards as "damages," and this Article refers to them as "equitable
relief," the distinction is really semantic if at the end of the day the plaintiff is
compensated monetarily for the violation of the public interest caused by the employer's
wrongful conduct.
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Under the 1991 Act, it is now clearly established
that punitive damages are available in Title VII and the ADA cases in which an
employer has engaged in "discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." /d. §
1981a(b)(1). The Supreme Court has further elucidated this standard in Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass 'n by focusing on whether an employer discriminated against an
employee in the face of a perceived risk that its actions would violate federal law. 527
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this sense constitutes a remedy that a court may deem appropriate in
order to effectuate the purposes of the statute. 185 In this regard, this
relief will serve not so much to "punish" a specific employer for
particularly egregious conduct, 186 but more to satisfy the broader
statutory mandate of deterring all employers throughout the economy
from engaging in unlawful employment discrimination.
Clearly, individual plaintiffs in better-than-even-chance cases will
not object if they receive the full value of the job they have more likely
than not lost through unlawful discrimination. Employers, on the other
hand, will maintain that they should be on the hook only for the damage
they actually caused. 187 There are at least three responses to these
employers. First, to the extent that the employer has discriminated and
has made it impossible to determine the exact chance a plaintiff would
have had to obtain the position in the absence of discrimination, he
should not now be permitted to use that uncertainty as a legal sword to
U.S. 526, 536 (1999). Moreover, in this context, punitive damages cannot be imputed
to the employer if the employer can prove that the employment decisions of its
managerial agents were contrary to its good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. See
id. at 545.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) ("[T]he court may ... order ... any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."); see also Franks, 424 U.S. at 770
("The fashioning of appropriate remedies invokes the sound equitable discretion of the
district courts."). This broad equitable power is believed to have been based upon
similar language in the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA "), which permits the
National Labor Relations Board to "take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate
the policies of [the] NLRA." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c); see also Franks, 424 U.S. at 769
n.29 ("To the extent that there is a difference in the wording of the respective
provisions, § 706(g) grants, if anything, broader discretionary powers than those granted
the National Labor Relations Board.").
186. It is generally agreed that one of the central purposes of punitive damages
is to punish an employer for especially outrageous conduct on the employer's part. See
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003); see also
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 183, at 948 ("By the punishment objective [of punitive
damages] we refer to society's goal of imposing appropriate sanctions on blameworthy
parties. ").
187. See Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 408 (N.J. 1990) ("It should be a selfevident principle of tort law that valuation of allowable damages 'is animated by a
premise similar to that underlying causation: that a tortfeasor should be charged only
with the value of the interest he destroyed.'") (quoting King, supra note 5, at 1356).
Such an argument is also consistent with an efficiency argument under a law and
economics approach. See Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability
Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 119, 124 (2003); see also Saul Levmore,
Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691,
692 (1990) ("The legal system is viewed as aiming to transfer payments from
wrongdoers to the victims they harm, and deviations from this norm are regarded as
errors."); Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 183, at 939 ("[O]ur basic analysis of
deterrence implies that injurers should have to pay for the entire harm they cause, in
order that injurers take appropriate precautions and that prices and participation in risky
activities are proper.").
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reduce his damage exposure. 188 If anything, such employers should have
to suffer from the uncertainty caused by their unlawful conduct, not the
wronged plaintiff. 189
Second, the Supreme Court has again and again emphasized the
prophylactic purposes of employment discrimination law. 190
Employment discrimination law is not just about compensating victims,
or even deterring employer conduct, but rather seeks to give employers
the incentive to take preventative steps to make the workplace more
welcoming to all. 191 Thus, if an employer reasonably seeks to prevent
sexual harassment in the workplace, and the employee unreasonably
fails to take advantage of such preventative opportunities or otherwise
fails to avoid harm, the employer has an affirmative defense against
vicarious liability in such cases. 192 Similarly, in the punitive damages
context, if the employer attempts in good faith to follow the dictates of
Title VII, whatever the egregiousness of the supervisor's conduct, the
employer will not be found liable for punitive damages. 193 Likewise, an
award of full equitable relief in these better-than-even-chance cases can
be seen as an additional incentive for employers to take preventative
action before misconduct diminishes an opportunity for hiring or
advancement in the workplace. 194
Third, perhaps the best argument is that the lost chance doctrine
should never apply in a better-than-even-chance case. 195 As courts and
commentators alike have argued, once a plaintiff is able to show, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that it is more likely than not that the
defendant caused her ultimate injury, there is no need to identify the

188. See GREEN, supra note 2, at 3 ("When defendants bear responsibility for
the gap in evidence, the case is especially strong [to relax the preponderance
threshold}."); see also United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1098-99 (6th
Cir. 1998) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to
consider the probability of the plaintiff being hired and instead construed ambiguities
against the employer); Trout v. Garrett, 780 F. Supp. 1396, 1406-07 (D.D.C. 1991)
(finding that, because the defendant was unable to show how many promotions were
available, ambiguities were resolved against the employer and each plaintiff was
awarded full back pay as if they had received the promotion).
189. See King, supra note 5, at 1378. A similar argument has been made for
shifting accident costs to manufacturers under a strict liability theory in the products
liability context. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in
Products liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 931-32 (1981).
190. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545 ("[Title V1I]'s 'primary objective' is 'a
prophylactic one,' it aims, chiefly, 'not to provide redress but to avoid harm."') (quoting
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06; and Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 417).
191. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
192. See id. at 806-07; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 762-63.
193. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545.
194. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
195. See Ellis, supra note 23, at 372.
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harm as the loss of the opportunity. 196 In other words, loss of chance
doctrine only provides for a percentage of damages based on the
probability of a favorable outcome in the absence of the defendant's
unlawful conduct. But, if a plaintiff under the traditional ali-or-nothing
approach can establish that it is more likely than not that the wrongdoer
caused the ultimate harm, there is no need to depend on the subsidiary
theory and its lesser compensations. 197
Thus, both traditional causation standards and the public nature of
employment discrimination statutes support a modified approach to lost
chance theory in the employment discrimination context. To the extent
overcompensation is argued to result as a consequence of this remedial
scheme, 198 such additional compensation should be seen as an equitable
remedy necessary to effectuate the broader public deterrence purposes of
employment discrimination statutes. 199
B.

Prudential Concerns Regarding Pure Lost Chance Theory

In addition to the important statutory concerns regarding the publicoriented nature of employment discrimination law, further prudential
considerations counsel against adopting the pure lost chance theory in
the employment discrimination context. These prudential concerns can
be grouped into two main areas.
First, and chief among these concerns, are the perverse incentives
196. See id.; see also Donnini v. Ouano, 810 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Kan. Ct. App.
1991) (limiting the application of lost chance theory to not-better-than-even-chance
cases). But see Kieffer, supra note 9, at 573 (arguing that not applying lost chance to
better-than-even-chance cases is inconsistent with current efforts to curb perceived
excesses of the tort system).
197. See Ellis, supra note 23, at 372 ("[Loss of chance] should be understood as
a 'techniqueD for mitigating the perceived injustice' of granting summary judgments or
directed verdicts to all doctors who act negligently toward patients with a not-betterthan-even chance of survival.") (quoting DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 157 (1989)); see also McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosps., 725
N.E.2d 1117, 1122 (Ohio 2000) ("[W]e never intended to force [the lost chance] theory
on a plaintiff who could otherwise prove that specific negligent acts of the defendant
caused the ultimate harm."); Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34) (suggesting that the
only type of case in which the "novel" loss of a chance claim makes sense is where
patients had a chance of survival of less than 50% even in the absence of negligence).
198. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206 ("[T]hough to avoid the opposite evils of
overcompensation and overdeterrence [lost chance} ... must be applied across the
board, that is, to high-probability as well as to low-probability [employment
discrimination] cases."). Judge Posner's pure lost approach is consistent with a law and
economics precept favored in all types of proportional liability cases; that is "the central
idea ... that a defendant should pay for damages incurred discounted by the probability
that the defendant caused the damages." GREEN, supra note 2, at 9 n.22; see also
Makdisi, supra note 2, at 1073.
199. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
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that defense counsel will have to confuse and mislead the judge or jury200
to reduce the amount of her client's liability. 201 Such incentives will
inevitably occur because almost no plaintiff in a competitive hiring or
promotion case will be able to prove that she had an absolute, 100%
chance of receiving a position. 202 A loss of a chance argument will
normally be available to defense counsel to argue that in the absence of
discrimination, there were many other reasons why the employee did not
receive the position. 203 Consequently, the record of these cases will be
further clouded as various forms of complex evidence are adduced to
approximate the exact chance a plaintiff had of receiving a job. 204
Second, the additional administrative costs introduced into these
types of employment discrimination cases by way of the pure lost chance
theory must be considered. Law and economics scholars refer to
administrative costs as "the legal and other expenses and costs
[including time and effort] borne by parties in resolving disputes that
arise when harm occurs. " 205 There is little doubt that the added
complexity of lost chance theory will exacerbate to some degree the
administrative costs associated with litigation. 206 Parties will likely seek

200. It is more likely that judges will make lost chance calculations in
employment discrimination cases because they determine equitable remedies such as
back pay and front pay. See, e.g., Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1015 (calculating the equitable
remedies in a pattern and practice employment discrimination case). But see Biondo,
382 F.3d at 688 (addressing a case in which lost chance calculations in an employment
discrimination case led to "inexplicable verdict[s]" concerning certain members of the
class). To the extent that judges rather than juries resolve these issues, it may be harder
for defense counsel to confuse more sophisticated jurists with this type of evidence and
the concomitant calculations. But see infra note 207.
20 I. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 365.
202. See GREEN, supra note 2, at 5 ("Evidence is never perfect; uncertainty
always exists.").
203. A similar defense exists for employers under the "same decision" test in
mixed-motive cases under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
204. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 365. Although one can make the argument
that defendants in traditional tort cases also seek to cloud the record to benefit their
clients in marginal cases (that is, cases in which it is a close call as to whether traditional
causation can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence), there is certainly less
reason why we should encourage defense counsel to engage in this tactic in cases where
meeting the preponderance standard is never in doubt (that is, where the only question is
whether it was 95% likely that the defendant caused the plaintiffs injury versus 90%
likely).
205. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 57
(2004). More specifically, administrative considerations include the volume of suits, the
probability of litigation given suit, and the average expense of litigation. See Steven
Shavell, Uncenainty over Causation and the Detennination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. &
EcON. 587, 604 (1985).
206. See Shavell, supra note 205, at 604 ("[A]dministrative costs would be
higher under the proportional approach than under a probability threshold criterion.").
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to present dueling experts and adduce intricate evidence concerning the
probability of an individual receiving a particular position. 207
However, to the extent that these lost chance awards are limited to
equitable relief such as back pay, reinstatement, and front pay, judges
will be the ones considering statistical evidence and dueling experts. 208
Although by no means error-proof, judges will be more likely to
minimize the additional administrative costs this type of evidence will no
doubt cause. Recent case law suggests, however, that juries will be
involved in these lost chance calculations in employment discrimination
cases as these damages may not only involve equitable relief, but also
emotional distress damages, and potentially, punitive damages. 209
Compensatory and punitive damages are remedial issues that a plaintiff
may decide to have a jury determine under the 1991 Act. 210 Given this
fact, the minimization of administrative costs through the use of judges
in these cases is somewhat questionable.
In short, prudential considerations also counsel against adoption of
207. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 365 ("If complicated statistical data would
not be enough to make a juror's eyes glaze over, the potentially endless stream of
experts who could testify on the patient's membership in a group that would have
responded favorably to early diagnosis or treatment would probably finish the job.").
208. In an employment discrimination case involving a probabilistic injury, not
only will a plaintiff seek equitable remedies like back pay, front pay, and various forms
of injunctive and declaratory relief, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), but at least under Title
VII and the ADA, she will likely also seek compensatory and punitive damages. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981a. Although a jury alone could award compensatory and punitive
damages, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c), the judge could award back pay and front pay as
equitable remedies to place the plaintiff in the position she would have been in absent the
discriminatory conduct. See Pollard v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843,
847-48 (2001) ("Plaintiffs who allege employment discrimination on the basis of sex
traditionally have been entitled to such remedies as injunctions, reinstatement, backpay,
lost benefits, and attorney's fees under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ")
(citations omitted). Pollard also makes clear that front pay is a type of equitable relief
under Title VII. Id. at 854 (finding that front pay is a type of equitable remedy under
Section 706(g) of Title VII). In this sense, lost chance theory in the employment
discrimination context may have a decided advantage over its tort law counterpart to the
extent that judges rather than juries will be handling these complex probabilistic
calculations. But see Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3 n.3) (discussing computation
blunders made by judges in loss of a chance cases).
209. See Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. Traditional punitive damages would
probably not be available in lost chance employment discrimination cases, as it makes
less sense to say that an employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice ... with malice
or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual," see 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(l), when the plaintiff had only lost less than a
50% chance of receiving a competitive position. This is even more so considering the
Kolstad court's emphasis on the employer's state of mind, rather than the egregiousness
of the conduct. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(c)(l) ("(c) Jury trial-If a complaining party seeks
compensatory or punitive damages under this section-(!) any party may demand a trial
by jury .... ").
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the pure lost chance theory in better-than-even-chance employment
discrimination cases because it inappropriately provides additional
opportunities to cloud the remedial issues and needlessly increases
administrative costs to the litigation system.
IV. A PUBLIC INTEREST MODEL FOR APPLYING LOST CHANCE THEORY
TO PROBABILISTIC INJURIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES

A.

Setting Up the Employment Discrimination Litigation Context for
Lost Chance Theory

In place of pure lost chance theory, this Article advances a public
interest approach for remedying probabilistic injuries in employment
discrimination litigation. Before setting out the components of this
approach, however, it is important to first set out the legal framework
for an employment discrimination case to establish at what points the
lost chance analysis may come into play.
In a run-of-the-mill intentional employment discrimination case211
under Title VII, 212 the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the
preponderance of the evidence that she suffered an adverse employment
action because of her race, sex, color, national origin, or religion. 213
Although there may be different proof frameworks available to the
plaintiff depending upon the type of evidence available, 214 and based on
whether the case involves an individual or a group, 215 the first part of
211. Although there is no evident reason why the public interest model to lost
chance theory set forth herein cannot apply to disparate impact claims under section
703(k) of Title VII, id. § 2000e-2(k), for ease of analysis, the following narrative
assumes an intentional, disparate treatment employment discrimination case involving
either an individual or a group of plaintiffs. See id. § 2000e-2(a).
212. Although this analysis utilizes Title VII, the same approach to employment
discrimination cases generally also exists under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a, the
Rehabilitation Act, id. § 791, Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Title I of the ADA,
id. §§ 12101-12118.
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (m).
214. In individual hiring or promotion cases, a plaintiff may proceed under the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green pretext framework. See Texas Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (setting forth the framework
established under McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). A plaintiff may also
proceed under the mixed-motive framework codified by the 1991 Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Nevertheless, there is some question whether the
McDonnell Douglas analysis remains viable as a consequence of the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. 539 U.S. 90 (2003); see also
Dare v. Wai-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991-92 (D. Minn. 2003)
(questioning the continuing validity of the McDonnell Douglas framework in light of
Desert Palace). Regardless of how one comes down on this issue, it should not have
any impact on the analysis herein.
215. As discussed above, the Teamsters framework applies to systemic disparate
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any such employment discrimination case consists of a plaintiff
establishing liability for unlawful discrimination under the applicable
framework by the preponderance of the evidence. 216 Moreover, up to
the point when liability attaches, lost chance theory should not play any
role in the legal analysis. 217
Once liability has been established, the defendant may have various
substantive defenses at its disposal to either reduce or completely defeat
the amount of damages. ·For instance, in a mixed-motive case under
Title VII, the defendant can substantially diminish the amount of
damages by establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that it
would have made the. same decision regarding the plaintiff even in the
absence of unlawful discrimination. 218 Similarly, in a group disparate
treatment case, although a presumption of liability for every plaintiff in
a group or class is established once liability is proven, the employer may
establish that an individual plaintiff in the group is entitled to less or no
relief. 219
As far as the interaction between these employment discrimination
substantive defenses and lost chance theory, Judge Posner has suggested
that a district judge could "apply [the defendant's burden of proof] to
probabilities as distinct from certainties of loss. " 22 For instance,

°

[i]f ... the government is able to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Doll had no more than a 20 percent
chance of being appointed foreman in lieu of [the other
applicant] (had the Veterans Administration complied with the
Rehabilitation Act), it will be open to the district judge to
treatment cases under Title VII. As in the individual intentional discrimination cases,
the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the plaintiffs during the liability phases of the
trial to prove unlawful discrimination. See supra note 122.
216. Regardless of which framework is utilized, "[t]he ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
217. Although issues of causation must be decided during the liability phase of
employment discrimination litigation, lost chance only involves the reconceptualizing of
the harm caused by the defendant and then the valuation of that harm. See GREEN,
supra note 2, at 4 (recognizing that reconceptualizing the interest harmed is at the heart
of the lost chance approach).
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (providing that the plaintiff is limited
to declaratory relief, specific types of injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs if the
defendant meets the same decision test). Importantly, if the defendant is able to satisfy
the same decision test, no form of monetary damages or equitable relief is available.
See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
219. See supra note 122. Additionally, the defendant may reduce the amount of
damages by proving that it would have fired the plaintiff anyway based on derogatory
evidence acquired after the plaintiff was discharged for unlawfully discriminatory
reasons. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1995).
220. Doll, 15 F.3d at 1207.
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consider whether to award Doll 20 percent of the back pay that
the judge awarded him in the first round of this litigation. 221
Thus, once the interest harmed is identified as the opportunity of
receiving a position, the employer, through its defenses, can adduce
evidence to seek to establish the loss of chance the plaintiff actually
suffered. 222 On the other hand, if the defendant cannot meet its burden
of persuasion under the same decision test or any other substantive
defense, the fact finder will be free to set the percentage lost based on
the relevant evidence presented by the parties in the liability phase of the
case. 223
B.

The Fundamentals of the Public Interest Model

Having placed the lost chance remedial theory into the larger
employment discrimination litigation context, the following Sections set
out the three steps that fact finders should follow in determining how to
evaluate a loss of a chance caused by the discriminatory denial of a
competitive position.
1.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE INTEREST HARMED

First, the court must properly identify the interest lost in such
probabilistic cases. 224 The interest harmed is not the ultimate job loss
suffered by the plaintiff, but rather the loss of an opportunity to obtain
the job without discriminatory conduct being involved. 225 Thus, the
interest harmed in a competitive hiring or promotion case in the
employment context is the chance of receiving a position now or in the
future (for example, as in the Biondo case). 226 With regard to causation,
the plaintiff must merely show that the employer's discriminatory
actions were more likely than not the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs loss

221. /d.
222. /d. To be clear, in a lost chance case, the employer's defense does not go
to whether the plaintiff would have received the job absent discrimination, but whether it
was more likely than not that the defendant's conduct caused a certain percentage of lost
opportunity in obtaining a job as a result of its unlawful discriminatory conduct. /d.
223. For a discussion of the relevant evidence a fact finder may rely on to set a
plaintiff's percentage of chance lost in an employment discrimination case, see infra Part
IV.B.2.
224. See supra notes 49-51.
225. See supra note 66; see also Aagaard, supra note 49, at 1341 ("Courts in
these cases must distinguish carefully the losses associated with the tort injury from the
losses associated with the plaintiff's underlying injury. This distinction, however, eludes
many courts.").
226. 382 F.3d at 684-85.
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of a chance. 227 In situations where it is quite clear that only one
employer was involved in discriminatorily not selecting the plaintiff for
the position in question, establishing that the same employer was the
"but for" cause of the plaintiff losing a certain quantum of chance
should be relatively easy to establish. 228
2.

DETERMINATION OF THE PROBABILITY THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD
HAVE RECEIVED A POSITION ABSENT UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION

Second, the fact finder will have to determine the probabilities of a
given plaintiff having received a job in the absence of discrimination. 229
As noted previously, this endeavor is much more art than science, 230 and
the fact finder will no doubt have to engage in an empirical
approximation. 231 Nevertheless, there are factors that should play a role
in determining the relative likelihood that a plaintiff would have received
a position in the absence of discrimination. 232 For instance, factors such
as educational background, relevant past job experience, seniority, and
the score on a validated performance test are all relatively objective
criteria that the court could use in determining the probability of
someone receiving a job. 233 In addition, each side could employ experts,
utilizing comparative data of people who were actually hired or
promoted, to determine the likelihood of success in the absence of
discrimination. 234 Finally, the testimony of the plaintiff and other
227. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4) (observing that even in lost
chance cases, the plaintiff must still "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant's negligence caused that loss of a chance") (citing King, supra note 5, at
1394-95); see also Jorgensen, 616 N.W.2d at 370-71; Aagaard, supra note 49, at 1341.
As the South Dakota Supreme Court wrote in Jorgensen: "As a distinct cause of action,
the loss of a chance must still be proven under the traditional standard of proof. That is,
the plaintiff must still prove ... that the defendant's conduct operated to reduce his
chance of a more favorable outcome." 616 N.W.2d at 370-71, abrogated by legislative
amendment, S.D. CODIFIED LAws§ 20-9-1.
228. See Aagaard, supra note 49, at 1342.
229. See, e.g., Bishop, 212 F.3d at 1016.
230. Id. at 1016.
231. See supra note 72.
232. See, e.g., Biondo, 382 F.3d at 689.
233. /d. at 689-90.
234. Weigand, supra note 9, at 310 ("While expert testimony is crucial to all
medical malpractice claims, it is especially so in loss of chance claims."); Truckor,
supra note 17, at 364-65; see also Albright, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 640-41 (relying on
expert testimony to establish the value of the lost promotion to each plaintiff, and then
multiplying the promotion value by the probability that each plaintiff would have
received the promotion). Of course, to the extent that the administrative costs become
too steep because this type of complex and costly evidence must be adduced for a large
number of plaintiffs in a class, one could instead rely on the average worker theory
utilized by Judge Easterbrook in Biondo. 382 F.3d at 690 ("Because none of the
plainti~fs presented comparative evidence, the view most favorable to the plaintiffs as a
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relevant third parties may provide valuable information for a judge
seeking to approximate the probability of a plaintiff receiving a job in
the absence of discrimination. 235
Once the judge calculates the initial chance that an individual
plaintiff had at receiving a given job, the loss of chance calculation is
simpler in the employment discrimination context than in the tort
context. 236 This is because once the employer has discriminated against
the plaintiff so that she can no longer receive a position, the
postdiscrimination chance at receiving the job is exactly 0%. 237 In other
words, although the plaintiff may eventually receive equitable or
injunctive relief placing her in the same position she would have been in
the absence of discrimination, 238 right after the employer discriminated
against her unlawfully she has no chance of receiving the position that
has now been filled by someone else. Thus, unlike the tort context in
which the fact finder must calculate the odds at survival after the
medical malpractice, no such calculation need take place in the
employment discrimination context. If the plaintiff had a 25% chance of
receiving a job prior to discrimination, once she is discriminated against
and not selected, her loss of chance is also 25%.

3.

DIVIDING PLAINTIFFS INTO APPROPRIATE LOST CHANCE
CATEGORIES

Third, and finally, depending upon the probabilities calculated,
plaintiffs will be divided into three categories: better-than-even-chance
plaintiffs, not-better-than-even-chance plaintiffs, and de mmtmts
plaintiffs. 239 For those who are able to establish that they had more than
group is that each would have done as well as the average lieutenant on the 1992 and
1998 exams.").
235. Truckor, supra note 17, at 364-65. But see Biondo, 382 F.3d at 689-90
(criticizing the use of some of these forms of evidence to determine probabilities).
236. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26).
237. In this sense, employment discrimination injuries are like those injuries in
medical malpractice cases where the doctor absolutely destroys any chance a patient had
at survival. /d.
238. See supra note 208.
239. Regardless of whether there is one plaintiff or multiple plaintiffs, the
employer may still be undercompensating or overcompensating the plaintiff under the
public interest model. This outcome is the result of the existence of some probability
that the selected candidate (that is, the individual that is not discriminated against) would
have been offered the position in the absence of discrimination. See infra tbl.B. The
advantage of the public interest approach to lost chance, nonetheless, includes the fact
that less-than-even-chance plaintiffs will receive some compensation for their losses
caused by a clearly discriminatory employer rather than none. Furthermore, in betterthan-even-chance cases, the overcompensation can be written off as equitable relief
necessary for the fulfillment of employment discrimination law's public-regarding
purposes. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
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a 50% chance of receiving a job in the absence of discrimination, the
public interest model awards the full value of the job240 to effectuate the
public interests sought to be vindicated by employment discrimination
law. 241 This is also necessary to be consistent with traditional causation
standards. 242 On the other hand, for those who establish a 50% chance
or less of receiving a job in the absence of discrimination, lost chance
theory will be applied to provide the plaintiff with an award that is
equivalent to the total value of the job multiplied by the percentage of
the lost chance. 243 Finally, for administrative cost reduction purposes
and to prevent frivolous claims from reaching the courthouse, those
plaintiffs establishing less than a 10% chance of receiving a job in the
absence of discriminatory treatment will be precluded from
recovering. 244

C.

A Hypothetical Illustration of the Public Interest Model

To better illustrate how the public interest model will work in
practice, it is helpful to consider a hypothetical employment
discrimination case involving the denial of a competitive promotion for
unlawful discriminatory reasons. Under the facts of this case, ABC
Corporation has a standard operating procedure of not promoting
African Americans to positions of responsibility in their organization.
During the most recent round of promotions, the employer considered
five applicants for the position of Lead Supervisor, four African
American employees and one white employee. As a result of the
selection process, the white applicant was selected.
240. The "full value of the job" refers primarily to a combination of back pay,
front pay, or reinstatement, which the judge will determine in her discretion. See supra
note 208. Even if there is a jury seated to determine compensatory or punitive damages,
these monetary awards should not impact the judge's lost chance calculations. See
Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. This is because the damages for emotional distress and
egregious conduct will most likely be discounted (or in the case of punitive damages, not
awarded at all) as a result of the jury considering the likelihood of a plaintiff having
received a position absent discrimination. Jd. In any event, such calculations should not
affect the judge's equitable determination concerning what the job is worth in terms of
back pay, front pay, or reinstatement. /d.
241. See supra note 25. One additional interesting issue that will need to be
addressed when determining the "full value of the job" is when the applicable limitations
period accrues. See Weigand, supra note 9, at 309. Because the interest harmed in loss
chance cases is the loss of an opportunity, the limitations period should start to run at the
time the opportunity is denied, not when the ultimate harm occurs. Jd. However, this
confusion should not arise in the employment discrimination context, as the time the
opportunity is denied and the time when the ultimate harm occurs are the same. See
supra Part IV.A.2.
242. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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Unhappy with the outcome of the selection process, three out of the
four African American employees bring a pattern and practice disparate
treatment case under the Teamsters model alleging a systemic policy of
unlawfully excluding African Americans from supervisory positions, in
violation of Title VII. 245 The evidence establishes quite clearly that the
candidates all had the necessary educational background for the position
in question, but that the candidates' past relevant job experience could
be divided into three all-inclusive groups: extensive, moderate, and
minimal. As it turns out, the white employee selected for the promotion
had moderate experience.
The African American employees are able to successfully show
during the liability phase of the trial that the employer engaged in
unlawful race discrimination in violation of Title VII. 246 Consequently,
a presumption is established that each plaintiff is entitled to some level
of relief. 247 Nevertheless, ABC Corporation still has the ability to show
that one or more of the individual plaintiffs is not entitled to relief. 248
Assuming for the sake of the argument that ABC Corporation cannot
meet its burden during the damages phase of the trial, 249 the judge250
turns to the public interest approach to lost chance theory to fashion a
remedy for the three successful plaintiffs.
First, the judge identifies the interests harmed by ABC
Corporation's wrongful actions. The judge identifies the harm as the
loss of chance of the three African American plaintiffs to receive the
promotion in question. Next, he determines that one African American
plaintiff, Plaintiff A with extensive experience, had a 52% chance (that
is, a better-than-even chance) of receiving the job absent discrimination,
and therefore, awards the full value of the job to that plaintiff by
awarding back pay and instating her into the supervisor position. 251
245. For a discussion of the Teamsters framework for systemic disparate
treatment cases, see supra note 122.
246. To reiterate, for liability to attach, there is no need to undertake a lost
chance calculation at this stage of the litigation. See supra Part IV .A.
247. See supra note 122.
248. /d.
249. In a real case, the ABC Corporation might be able to prove that Plaintiff C
with only minimal experience would not have received the promotion under any
circumstances. Notice, however, that because the public interest model applies a 10%
de minimis threshold, the result is the same regardless of the phase in which lost chance
applies. See supra tbi.A.
250. For the sake of simplicity, this hypothetical assumes that no compensatory
or punitive damages are being requested. For a further discussion regarding whether a
judge or jury should make loss chance calculations in employment discrimination
litigation, see supra notes 207, 240.
251. If instatement is inappropriate because of hostility, or because the plaintiff
is already working at a different job at a different company, front pay may be utilized as
an equitable remedy to place the plaintiff in the position he would have been in absent
discrimination. See Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1212 (7th Cir.
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As for the remaining two African American plaintiffs, Plaintiff B
has moderate experience and Plaintiff C has minimal experience, thus
each has a not-better-than-even chance of receiving the position.
Additionally, the other nonplaintiff African American employee had
minimal experience. To value the chance of each of these individuals to
receive the job, the judge establishes in total that these four remaining
applicants combined (the two remaining plaintiffs, the one African
American nonplaintiff and the successful white applicant) had a 48%
chance of receiving the job, and that because of differences in
experience, the moderate experience candidates had a 16% chance of
receiving the job, whereas the minimal experience candidates had an 8%
chance of receiving the job. Based on these valuations, the judge
awards Plaintiff B 16% of the value of the job and awards Plaintiff C
nothing under the de minimis exception. 252
Table B
Hypothetical Applying Lost Chance (Public Interest Model) to ABC
Corporation Scenario
Plaintiffs

Experience

Plaintiff A

Extensive

Chance of
Obtaining Job
52%

Plaintiff B

Moderate

16%

Plaintiff C

Minimal

8%

Remedy
100% of
Value of
Job253
16% ofValue
of Job
0% (De
Minimis)

1989) (observing that an award of front pay should make a plaintiff whole in the absence
of reinstatement).
252. See supra notes 82-85 for the advantages of adopting de minimis
exception.
253. "Value of the job" as utilized in these Tables refers to some combination of
back pay, front pay, or instatement that represents how much a plaintiff lost by being
denied a competitive position on the basis of unlawful discrimination. See supra note
235.
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Table C
Hypothetical Applying Lost Chance (Pure Version) to ABC Corporation
Scenario
Plaintiffs

Experience

Plaintiff A

Extensive

Chance of
Obtaining Job
52%

Plaintiff B

Moderate

16%

Plaintiff C

Minimal

8%

Remedy

52% of
Value of
Job
16% of
Value of
Job
8% of
Value of
Job

TableD
Hypothetical Applying Traditional Ali-or-Nothing Approach to ABC
Corporation Scenario
Plaintiffs

Experience

Plaintiff A

Extensive

Chance of
Obtaining Job
52%

Plaintiff B
Plaintiff C

Moderate
Minimal

16%
8%

D.

Remedy

100% of
Value of
Job
0%
0%

Preliminary Conclusions Regarding the Public Interest Model

In reviewing the results of the hypothetical discussed above, three
preliminary conclusions are possible. First, the public interest approach
to lost chance theory represents a principled compromise for meeting the
sometimes contradictory public and private aims of employment
discrimination law. 254 As a compromise to these sometimes intractable
issues, it will hopefully satisfy, to some extent, both law and economic
adherents who focus on proper deterrence and allocation of resources, 255
as well as those who favor the relative simplicity of the traditional alior-nothing approach.
Second, and as a result of the factual circumstances surrounding the
254. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 373 (describing the lost chance approach as
a compromise between the aU-or-nothing approach and relaxed causation approach).
255. See supra note 25.
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hypothetical example, notice that under the public interest model, the
employer ends up paying a total of 116% of the value of the job for
which it discriminatorily selected the white candidate, as compared to
100% under the ali-or-nothing approach. 256 This additional 16% of
compensation can be viewed as a punitive-type of equitable relief
awarded to the plaintiffs in order to support the public goals of
employment discrimination law, 257 as well as at least symbolically
making the employer acknowledge that its own bad conduct caused not
only victim specific damage, but harm to society in general. 258
·
Third, and finally, the valuation process, as demonstrated above,
remains more of an exercise in approximation rather than an attempt to
arrive at a mathematically pure figure. Nevertheless, and as discussed
by other jurists and commentators, 259 this fact alone should not
undermine lost chance theory as a viable way of justly compensating
those who have suffered at the hands of a discriminatory employer. 260
Indeed, such an approach is a modem day slicing of the Gordian Knot;
256. Interestingly, the pure lost chance model leads to the undercompensation of
all three plaintiffs by a total of 8% because of the fact that one black employee did not
join in the lawsuit against the employer. See supra tbi.C. This result again suggests
that a mandatory joinder motion under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should be utilized to prevent systemic undercompensation in pure lost chance theory
cases. See supra note 156 (discussing the advantages of a Rule 19 motion in this
context).
257. In this regard, although the ali-or-nothing approach is successful in
providing meaningful "make whole" relief for one of the plaintiffs, it ignores the fact
that the employer's conduct also had a more than a de minimis impact on Plaintiff B.
See Wax, supra note 5, at 1214. As Amy Wax wrote: "If race or sex is found to be the
'determinative' cause of an adverse employment action, then the victim obtains a full
'make whole' measure of relief. If that finding is not made, the claimant gets nothing."
/d. Thus, one of the chief advantages of the public interest model over the ali-ornothing approach is that it does not completely ignore reprehensible conduct against one
of the plaintiffs as though it never happened. See supra note 48, 51.
258. And thus, overcoming the current overemphasis on monetary relief in these
types of cases. See Selmi, supra note 21, at 1251-52.
259. See Bishop, 212 F.3d at 1016 (observing that lost chance calculations are
more art than science); Aagaard, supra note 49, at 1350 (arguing for a discretionary
approach to valuing the loss of chances).
260. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206-07. As the court stated in Doll:
It would be hard to pick a number that would reliably estimate the
probability of Doll's receiving the promotion but for discrimination. Would
it be 5 percent? 10 percent? 40 percent? Who knows? Yet no less
uncertainty attends the efforts of triers of fact to fix the percentage of a
plaintiffs negligence in a tort case governed, as most tort cases are today, by
the rule of comparative negligence.
!d.; see, e.g., Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding an
allocation of 97% of the fault to the plaintiff). If the uncertainty is bearable there,
why is it not bearable in an employment case? The unarticulated, unacknowledged
difference-splitting that the plaintiff thinks the judge engaged in here does not
appear to be a superior approach.
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that is, it represents the most bold and energetic remedial method for
comprehensively meeting the two central statutory purposes of
employment discrimination law. 261
The public interest model to lost chance for probabilistic injuries in
employment discrimination cases adopted in this Article represents the
best accommodation of the public and private interests sought to be
advanced by employment discrimination law. On one hand, it provides
compensation for those who have been wronged and would receive no
recovery under the traditional ali-or-nothing approach. 262 On the other
hand, this approach serves the public interest by awarding punitive-like
equitable relief to employees who had a better-than-even chance of
receiving a position in the absence of discrimination, thereby furthering
the public goal of eradicating all forms of discrimination from the
workplace. 263
V.

CONCLUSION

Applying lost chance theory to probabilistic injuries in competitive
hiring and promotion cases in the employment discrimination context
generally leads to more just and equitable results than any other
remedial scheme. Nevertheless, this Article seeks to amend the pure
lost chance theory approach advocated elsewhere with the public interest
model. Under this public interest model, lost chance theory is applied
only to not-better-than-even-chance employment discrimination cases
with at least a 10% loss of chance of initially obtaining a competitive
position. At the same time, the traditional ali-or-nothing approach
continues to apply to better-than-even-chance cases. The benefit to be
gained from this hybrid approach is that the public interest goals
underlying employment discrimination law will again be appropriately
given prominence. To the extent that overcompensation results because
of this remedial scheme, such additional compensation should be seen as
a punitive-like equitable remedy, necessary to effectuate the broader
public policy mandate of federal employment discrimination law: to
eradicate unlawful employment discrimination throughout the economy.

261. See supra note 140.
262. In the hypothetical, Plaintiff B represents the plaintiff who would be
otherwise undercompensated under the traditional ali-or-nothing approach. Compare
supra tbi.B, with supra tbi.D.
263. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
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